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Struggle in the Sunshine City:  
The Movement for Racial Equality in St. Petersburg Florida, 1955-1968 
 
Peyton L. Jones 
 
ABSTRACT 
 
 
 Recent decades have seen a shift in the focus of civil rights historiography. 
Building upon the exhaustive studies of national figures and events, and in search of new 
perspectives, many historians have concentrated on local movements often ignored or 
forgotten. Other than the work of a few local scholars, the civil rights movement as it 
occurred in St. Petersburg, Florida, has received little attention. Furthermore, the limited 
scholarship lacks the cohesion necessary to compare and contrast the movement with 
similar events throughout the state and across the nation. The story of St. Petersburg‟s 
active and significant struggle for social equality, placed within its proper context, adds 
another piece to a larger picture and continues to reveal the complex nature of the 
American Civil Rights Movement. 
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Chapter One: Introduction 
 Recent decades have seen a shift in the focus of civil rights historiography. 
Building upon the exhaustive studies of national figures and events, and in search of new 
perspectives, many historians have concentrated on local movements often ignored or 
forgotten. Other than the work of a few local scholars, the civil rights movement as it 
occurred in St. Petersburg, Florida, has received little attention. Furthermore, the limited 
scholarship lacks the cohesion necessary to compare and contrast the movement with 
similar events throughout the state and across the nation. The story of St. Petersburg‟s 
active and significant struggle for social equality, placed within its proper context, adds 
another piece to a larger picture and continues to reveal the complex nature of the 
American Civil Rights Movement. 
 In the years following the Second World War, St. Petersburg was a burgeoning 
tourist Mecca and retirement haven. Between 1950 and 1960 the city‟s population 
increased eighty-seven percent, reaching 181,348 in 1960. Those flocking to St. 
Petersburg arrived in a place that seemed to live up to the picture painted in promotional 
leaflets and booster pamphlets: a warm, inviting community, blessed with a subtropical 
climate, pristine beaches, cheap land, and endless sunshine. A veritable “Sunshine City.”1 
 Absent from booster literature, however, were references to a substantial black 
population. From its earliest years, St. Petersburg‟s economy depended heavily on 
tourism and a black labor force to service that industry. The city‟s black underclass lived 
at the lowest civic stratum, confined by rigid Jim Crow laws. While the white seasonal 
residents and snowbirds enjoyed socializing on the city‟s famous green benches, listening 
to concerts in downtown Williams Park, or enjoying friendly competition at the 
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Shuffleboard Club, an army of African Americans swarmed into their hotel rooms to 
make beds, or into their homes to cook meals, clean the dishes, and tend to the 
landscaping. To most visitors, however, these workers remained invisible and their 
contribution to the region‟s economic development seemed irrelevant.2    
 City leaders justified racial oppression by framing the need to perpetuate 
segregation in economic terms. Black workers allowed hotels, restaurants, attractions, 
and the municipal infrastructure to handle the seasonal influx of tourists, yet business and 
governmental leaders assumed that snowbirds and their wallets would flock elsewhere if 
black residents became too visible. For those Detroiters concerned about blacks entering 
their neighborhoods back home, city leaders in St. Petersburg wanted them to feel 
reassured that no similar integration would darken their experience in the Sunshine City. 
With occasional concessions to the black community, often with a heavy dose of 
paternalism, the city‟s white power structure was able to deny the black community any 
real reform.   
 Indeed, St. Petersburg remained one of the most residentially segregated cities in 
the nation at the dawn of the civil rights era. In the city‟s earliest black neighborhoods, 
residents formed tight-knit, insular enclaves that drew strength from the bonds forged 
under social oppression. By the 1950s, beyond the auspices of white St. Petersburg, 
existed a stratified and culturally diverse black community. Along the rippling, brick-
lined 5
th
 Ave S., in an area known as Sugar Hill, lived members of St. Petersburg‟s black 
elite. With roots as old as the city itself, this small yet substantial black middle-class, 
                                                                                                                                                       
1 St. Petersburg Times, May 8, 1960. 
2 Arsenault, St. Petersburg and the Florida Dream, 124-125. 
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composed of physicians, clergymen, entrepreneurs, and educators, formed the backbone 
of the civil rights struggle.
3
 
  The epicenter of black society arose on 22
nd
 Ave S., where the likes of Louis 
Armstrong and Duke Ellington performed at the Manhattan Casino, where black doctors 
tended to patients at the segregated Mercy Hospital, and where residents went for food 
and sundries, to catch a movie, go dancing, or get their hair cut. Locals dubbed 22
nd
 Ave 
the “Deuces” and until the early sixties, in the earliest stages of integration, one could 
trace the heartbeat of black society back to this area. Yet the Manhattan Casino was not 
the Cotton Club in Harlem and for every black middle-class dwelling one did not have to 
look far to find abject poverty. In areas such as Methodist Town- where almost thirteen 
percent of the city‟s black population lived-dilapidated shanties stood unpainted and 
teeming with termites. Many homes had no indoor plumbing nor properly working 
electricity. Garbage piled high in front of sagging porches with rotten floorboards, lining 
dirt streets that turned to dust clouds on arid summer days and muddy streams during the 
evening thunderstorms. A handful of wealthy, politically connected white citizens owned 
all of Methodist Town‟s slum housing and successfully managed to strike down urban 
renewal legislation and thwart efforts to enforce minimum housing code requirements. 
The slumlords who regularly increased the rent rarely reinvested money back into the 
blighted neighborhood. With an average income of less than $3,000 a year, residents--in a 
relationship that resembled the landed gentry and the disfranchised sharecropper of 
earlier generations-- had no other choice but to stay put.
4
  
                                               
3 Rosalie Peck and Jon Wilson, St. Petersburg’s Historic African American Neighborhoods (Charleston, 
South Carolina: The History Press, 2008), 33-34.  
4 Author‟s interview with Omali Yeshitela, June 23, 2009; St. Petersburg Times, May 5, 1960, March 25, 
1962. Peck and Wilson, African American Neighborhoods, 31-33. 
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 Cracks in the paternalistic relationship between whites and blacks, and in the once 
entrenched, seemingly immutable social structure that defied life in St. Petersburg, began 
to appear in the 1950s. After the 1954 Supreme Court decision, Brown v. Board of 
Education, a number of St. Petersburg‟s black elite challenged the legality of segregated 
public facilities. In November 1955, shortly after several black residents were denied 
entrance to Spa Beach and Pool, a public recreational facility, six black citizens led by 
Dr. Fred Alsup filed suit against the city citing a violation of their constitutional rights. 
The legal battle lasted until April 1957, when the Supreme Court refused to hear the 
city‟s final appeal, but controversy over Spa Beach and pool continued. For almost two 
years, city administrators attempted to circumvent the Court‟s ruling by closing the pool 
any time blacks tried to use the facility. After a long standoff, Spa Beach and Pool 
eventually opened on an integrated basis in 1959.  
  But the struggle had only begun. During the 1960s, homegrown civic 
organizations like the Civic Coordinating Committee (CCC), the Council on Human 
Relations (COHR), along with local incarnations of nationally affiliated organizations 
like the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People (NAACP), the 
Congress of Racial Equality (CORE), and the Student Nonviolent Coordinating 
Committee (SNCC), continued the attack on racial segregation. By the mid-1960s, after 
the desegregation of lunch counters and movie theaters, the objectives of the struggle 
were no longer clear. In 1964, lawyer Jim Sanderlin, with the support of the NAACP 
Legal Defense Fund, took on the cause of desegregating the school system. Organizations 
like the CCC and COHR fought discrimination in the work place and tried to secure 
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better job opportunities for black citizens. While many saw these two areas as 
inextricably linked, others abandoned the notion of integration altogether.  
 Disillusionment spread throughout the black community in the middle and late 
1960s. Nonviolent forms of protest seemed inadequate at addressing the larger 
socioeconomic goals of the civil rights movement. Race riots erupted across the country. 
No longer could Americans pigeonhole white racism and bigotry or black 
impoverishment as a distinctly Southern phenomenon. America was sick. 
 The dissatisfaction was evident in St. Petersburg. A militant counter movement 
emerged that threatened to upend the advances of the local struggle and tear apart the 
fabric of the entire city. Much of the tension culminated in 1968, when St. Petersburg‟s 
sanitation workers-most of whom were black-went on strike. After a four-month standoff 
over better pay, St. Petersburg‟s black community dissolved into violent race riots. 
Similar to the transformative events that rocked other communities across America, the 
demands for reform by the sanitation workers in 1968 marked an important new era in 
the local struggle to trash the traditions of Jim Crow.    
 This study traces a thirteen year struggle for racial justice between 1955 and 
1968--one that began many years earlier and continues to this day. But during these 
years, St. Petersburg, like the nation itself, came to terms with a reality it had for too long 
denied. How could this happen in a sleepy resort town? What sort of light can St. 
Petersburg‟s story shed on the larger civil rights struggle in America?  As historians 
confront the larger geographic and regional identity of the Sunshine State, a peek into its 
race relations history is a necessary piece in a much larger puzzle.  
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Chapter Two: The Gathering Storm 
 In August 1955, black civil rights activists in St. Petersburg, Florida, waded into 
controversial currents. Ten members of the Civic Coordinating Committee (CCC), a 
prominent black civic organization, approached the racially segregated Spa Beach and 
Pool municipal swimming facility and attempted to gain entrance. After refusing to sell 
them tickets the cashier called the police, who told the activists to “use their own beach,” 
down the road at South Mole. The situation ended without incident shortly thereafter. 
Two months later, after petitioning the city for “public use” of Spa and getting no 
response, the CCC filed a federal lawsuit, citing a violation of equal protection 
guaranteed under the Fourteenth Amendment. Thus began a nearly four year struggle to 
integrate Spa--one that ultimately sparked a movement to end racial inequality 
throughout the city.
1
      
  The efforts to desegregate Spa were “no spur of the moment thing,” explained 
CCC president J.P. Moses. Indeed, controversy surrounding beach access for black 
residents stretched back nearly forty years. In 1916, when Mayor Al Lang granted blacks 
a strip of beach on the south side of the city that eventually became known as South 
Mole, white residents protested. The issue arose again during the Great Depression. As 
part of efforts to revive a moribund tourism industry, the city strengthened and officially 
codified its Jim Crow laws. Moreover, the parlous economic conditions intensified the 
racial divide. Whites lodged complaints about blacks traveling through white parts of 
town to get to South Mole. To ease the tensions, the city formed the Interracial Relations 
Committee (IRC). The IRC, according to historian Raymond Arsenault, focused 
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primarily on the black beach issue.  Efforts continued in the 1940s to no avail, and by 
1955, South Mole, a dingy strip of beach with no life guards and no bathing facilities, 
stood as the only place along St. Petersburg‟s forty-five miles of coastline for blacks to 
swim legally.
2
  
  Everything changed in 1954, when the U.S. Supreme Court outlawed public 
school desegregation in Brown v. Board of Education. While awaiting the Court‟s plan 
for implementing Brown, the National Association for the Advancement of Colored 
People (NAACP), with branches throughout the state, encouraged blacks to use their tax-
supported municipal facilities. “Why use beaches of your own when you have a beach 
that your taxes are paying for?” proclaimed NAACP attorney Ray Chisolm. While state 
officials worked to forestall public school integration, blacks across Florida, from Delray 
Beach and Daytona, to Miami and Sarasota, began testing the legality of segregated 
beaches.
3
 
 In the wake of Brown, black leaders in St. Petersburg began “pushing” for action. 
“We knew we needed to create an incident,” said black physician and CCC member, Fred 
Alsup. “I finally got my barber,” he remembered, “and said „let‟s get this thing on the 
road.‟” Upon arriving at Spa Beach and Pool, they “had no definite proof that Negroes 
would be denied the use” of the facilities, but the CCC activists anticipated rejection, 
                                                                                                                                                       
1 Darryl Paulson, “Stay Out, The Water‟s Fine: Desegregating Municipal Swimming Facilities in St. 
Petersburg, Florida,”Tampa Bay History 4, no. 2 (1982): 8; St. Petersburg Times, August 22, September 9, 
1955, September 21, 1955, and December 1, 1955. 
2 St. Petersburg Times, August 22, 1955, October 14, 1916; Raymond Arsenault, St. Petersburg and the 
Florida Dream, 1888-1950. (Gainesville: University of Florida Press, 1996), 265-267; and Paulson, “Stay 
Out,” 7. 
3 Richard Kluger, Simple Justice: The History of Brown v. Board of Education and Black America’s 
Struggle For Equality, 2nd ed. (New York: Vinatge Books, 2004), 711; Paulson, “Stay Out,” 8; New York 
Times, March 13, 1956.   
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hoping to lay the groundwork for “potential legal action.”4  
 The unexpected breech in racial etiquette elicited a streak of white hostility. In the 
days following the “swim-in,” a group of angry whites met at city hall and formed the St. 
Petersburg White Citizens‟ Council. The organization sent letters to restaurants and 
businesses downtown, urging merchants not to “help integrate the races.” But the fiercest 
opposition to integrating Spa came from City Manager Ross Windom, who condemned 
the “swim-in” and criticized the black community for its unhappiness with South Mole. 
However, the rash assemblage of reactionary forces and the dismay emanating from city 
hall mattered little once the CCC‟s case against the city, Alsup v. St. Petersburg, went to 
trial.
5
   
 Lawyers for the city faced an arduous task. A month before the CCC filed suit, on 
November 7, the Supreme Court had banned segregation at public facilities in Maryland. 
 The ruling affirmed a Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals decision regarding a case in 
Baltimore that determined the city had no right to bar any taxpaying citizens from public 
supported places. The decision augured well for Alsup and the other plaintiffs. Lawyers 
for the city contended that Spa Beach and Pool operated on a proprietary basis and 
allowing blacks to use the facility would damage its ability to turn a profit, thus 
differentiating the situation in St. Petersburg from the one in Baltimore. The federal 
District Court disagreed. “The capacity in which the city operates its swimming pool and 
beach is immaterial,” explained Judge George A. Whitehurst before ruling in favor of the 
plaintiffs. On appeal, a three-judge panel of the Fifth Circuit Court in New Orleans 
upheld the lower court‟s decision, stating: “It is no answer that the beach and pool cannot 
                                               
4 Evening Independent, 1985; Enoch Davis, On the Bethel Trail (St. Petersburg: Valkyrie Press, Inc. 1979), 
68-69; St. Petersburg Times, April 25, 1947, and August 22, 1955.  
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be operated at a profit on a nonsegregated basis, and that the city will be forced to close 
the pool. .Unfortunate as closing the pool may be, that furnishes no ground for abridging 
the rights of the appellees to its use without discrimination on the grounds of race so long 
as it is operated.” The U.S Supreme Court refused to hear the case and in April 1957 the 
original ruling became official.
6
 
 Despite the legal victory, blacks stayed away from Spa until 1958. While 
members of the CCC may have been free from white reprisals, the average black citizen 
had little to gain and a lot to lose from thumbing his nose at the city‟s white power 
structure; even if they had won the right to use Spa in federal court. The CCC, 
meanwhile, attempted to desegregate the seating on public buses. Just as Alsup v. St. 
Petersburg had gone to court in 1955, civil rights leaders in Alabama had begun the 
Montgomery Bus Boycott. Largely credited with kickstarting the modern American civil 
rights movement, the boycott and an accompanying lawsuit eventually secured an 
injunction against segregated bus seating policies in Alabama. Months later, a bus 
boycott in Florida successfully ended the discriminatory practice in Tallahassee, the state 
capital. In a meeting with Ross Windom, CCC cofounder and long time social activist 
Rev. Enoch Davis, along with Rev. Ben Wyland, urged the city manager to “avert the 
possibility” of another Tallahassee by dropping the segregated seating policy. Although 
no local ordinance ordered a separation of the races on public transit, Windom called 
their bluff and elected to preserve the tradition. Instead of a bus boycott, desegregation 
efforts returned to the beach and pool.
7
      
                                                                                                                                                       
5 St. Petersburg Times, September 22, 1955; and Paulson, “Stay Out,” 9. 
6
  St. Petersburg Times, November 7, 1955; and Paulson, “Stay Out,” 10.  
7 Glenda A. Rabby, The Pain and the Promise: The Struggle For Civil Rights in Tallahassee, Florida 
(Athens: University of Georgia Press, 1999), 3; St. Petersburg Times, April 27, 1956, June 13, 1956. 
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 The dormant Spa controversy awakened in June 1958 when eight black teenagers 
and college students bought tickets to the beach and went for a swim. The incident turned 
into a spectacle when a half dozen reporters and photographers showed up. After only 
thirty minutes the swimmers came ashore, gave interviews, used the showers, and left.
8
  
 What appeared not to bother white swimmers at the time eventually caused a local 
firestorm. When word of the incident reached city leaders, an outraged Windom shut 
down the facility. For three days police officers kept people out. Windom reopened Spa 
on June 7, and the next day a young black man, David Isom, paid his way into the pool 
area and swam unabated for more than an hour. Again Windom closed it down. 
Following the incident the city council, adhering to the “as long as it is operated by the 
city” portion of the appellate judgment, voted to close Spa down for the rest of the 
summer.
9
  
 Ross Windom and the city council found themselves in a precarious position. 
Keeping Spa closed was bad for business. But according to their logic, so was an 
integrated swimming facility. The city‟s old nostrum of quelling such a controversy with 
a search for a new segregated beach for blacks returned. To the dismay of Fred Alsup and 
Enoch Davis, the city council set aside $15,000 for the construction of an all-black beach 
in the northernmost part of the city, along the Gandy causeway, an area inaccessible to 
most of its intended users. The standoff was becoming more contentious. Rather than risk 
a mingling of the races, city officials were fostering social and economic turmoil.
10
    
 As the summer beach season came to a close and students returned to school, 
                                               
8 New York Times, June 6,1958; Deposition, Papers of the National Association for the Advancement of 
Colored People, Library of Congress, Washington, D.C.  
9 Ibid; St. Petersburg Times, June 9, 1958; and Paulson, “Stay Out,” 12.   
10 Ibid., 13. 
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Windom quietly reopened Spa in early September. A day passed without incident. But on 
September 4, a black teenage girl went for a swim at the beach. This time Windom took a 
different approach. “I realize that Negroes through court action have secured the legal 
right to use Spa Pool and Beach,” he said, but “we cannot escape from the reality that 
long established custom provides for separation of the races in recreational facilities.” 
Mayor Burroughs, echoing the city manager‟s sentiments, urged black residents to 
“cooperate with us in an effort to continue our good relationship.” The patronizing pleas 
fell upon deaf ears. Days later, another swim-in led the city council to close Spa 
indefinitely. In addition, the council took punitive measures and decided to use the 
money set aside for the proposed Gandy beach (for blacks) to develop an all-white beach 
in the North Shore area of the city.
11
     
     At this point, the protracted controversy had already begun to draw the ire of 
influential factions throughout the city. Downtown, merchants and hotel proprietors 
worried about rising racial tensions and a closed beach that threatened the tourism 
industry. The major media outlets stepped up the pressure, but from different sides of the 
debate. While the St. Petersburg Times endorsed reopening Spa on an integrated basis 
and chastised city administrators for letting the situation deteriorate, the St. Petersburg 
Evening Independent stood by the city manager and the mayor, suggesting tourists would 
rather vacation elsewhere if the city desegregated its swimming facilities. Local clergy 
groups pleaded with the city manager to soften his stance. But Windom, who once vowed 
not be the person “that integrated St. Petersburg,” refused to budge.12     
 As the political pressure built and the din of public frustration intensified, 
                                               
11 St. Petersburg Times, September 5, 1958, September 16, 1958. 
12 St. Petersburg Times, September 20, 1958; and Paulson, “Stay Out,” 14-15.   
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Windom and Burroughs played their last card. Since 1953 the city had flirted with the 
idea of building a cultural center, and hiring an engineering analysis firm out of New 
York to survey the best the location for such a project. Twice, once in 1953 and again in 
1957, the firm recommended that the city should build the proposed cultural center at the 
present location of the Alfred Whitted airpark, on a patch of land along the waterfront. 
After sitting on the project for more than a year, Burroughs suddenly suggested razing 
Spa Pool and building the cultural center in its place. Several downtown merchants 
immediately endorsed the idea, encouraging Burroughs, who a year earlier 
enthusiastically endorsed the Whitted airpark site, to hold “pep rallies” to garner support. 
Meanwhile, Windom flew around the country conferring with engineers involved with 
similar projects.
13
  
 Despite Burrough‟s and Windom‟s efforts, several city councilmen, the Council 
Of Neighborhood Associations (CONA), the St. Petersburg Planning Board, and the St. 
Petersburg Times all came out against the project. CONA president G. Harris Graham 
criticized the proposal as “slapped together,” and called for a “30 day cooling off period,” 
lest the city act impetuously. For much of the opposition the concern was more fiscal than 
racial or political. When it became clear that a cultural center was too big and too costly, 
a revised plan called for the building of a “geodesic dome” auditorium for an estimated 
$450,000. Incensed, Graham threatened to circulate a petition to block construction, 
claiming most of the citizenry does not “want an auditorium--they want sewers and street 
lights.”14 
  In early November, the city‟s efforts to prevent the integration of Spa began to 
                                               
13 St. Petersburg Times, September 9, 1958, September 19, 1958.  
14
 St. Petersburg Times, October 11, 1958, September 18, 1958... 
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unravel. First, the engineering firm Rader and Associates offered to build the auditorium 
for the elevated figure of $1.2 million. For people like Graham, support now seemed 
utterly out of the question. Still, city council members decided to move forward with the 
auditorium. A few days later, Windom unexpectedly announced his resignation. St. 
Petersburg‟s longest serving City Manager gave no reason for his abrupt departure. The 
final nail in the coffin came when CONA issued a petition that bearing signatures from 
7,767 registered voters, more than the ten percent needed to send the auditorium 
controversy before the electorate.
15
  
 Before a referendum could be held the city council abandoned the plan. 
Subsequently, the council voted to reopen Spa with the condition that acting City 
Manager Verlyn Fletcher had the authority to close it “should an emergency arise.” The 
beach and pool remained open from that point on. A 160-acre site at the city‟s North 
Shore became the new site for the proposed auditorium, bringing a quiet end to the long 
fight over Spa. And yet only the beginning of the struggle to desegregate the public 
sphere.
16
   
 By 1960 the hope of a rapid dismantling of the Jim Crow system in the South had 
faded. Desegregation efforts had met with massive white resistance and a rising tide of 
race-baiting political demagoguery. While the American economy boomed, white-flight 
in the North, disfranchisement in the South, and discrimination throughout the country, 
kept millions of black Americans economically impoverished. Although the dream of full 
racial equality was deferred, civil rights activists were consoled by the passage of two 
civil rights bills (1957 and 1960) and the Eisenhower administration‟s deployment of 
                                               
15 St. Petersburg Times, November 7, 1958, January 28, 1959. 
16 Miami News, January 6, 1959; St. Petersburg Times, January 14, 1959. 
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federal troops in Arkansas during the Central High School desegregation crisis. Such 
developments “legitimized” the black struggle and “prepared the way for a more massive 
and militant phase.” With faith in the legalistic means flagging the fight moved to the 
streets. The next “phase” of the movement began in Greensboro, North Carolina, in 
February 1960, when four black North Carolina A&T students conducted a sit-in at a 
Woolworth‟s lunch counter. Within weeks the sit-ins had spread to a number of cities, 
including St. Petersburg.
17
  
  Black civil rights activists in St. Petersburg (hoping to encourage city leaders to 
form a biracial committee) conducted two days of sit-ins in early March. On the second, 
C. Bette Wimbish and Gibbs Jr. College student Theodore Floyd sat in at the William 
Henry lunch counter. J.P. Moses and Rev. Dr. H. McDonald did the same at the Maas 
Bros. department store. Two unidentified black males sat in at the S.H. Kress lunch 
counter. In each case, the black activists were refused service, and the lunch counters 
immediately closed. “We were told they couldn‟t serve us because of the existing state 
and county laws,” said J.P Moses. In fact, the state‟s legal position gave proprietors 
operating public accommodations the right to serve anyone they pleased. Unlike the 
situation in the Deep South, local or state law existed that specifically prevented white 
establishments from serving blacks.
18
  
More sit-ins occurred the next day. This time, Theodor Floyd and close to 
thirty other college students took the demonstrations to Webb‟s City, “the world‟s 
largest variety store.” For twenty minutes the group waited by the turnstiles for 
“counter checks,” access passes to the lunch counter area. When employees from 
                                               
17 Harvard Sitkoff, The Struggle For Black Equality (New York: Hill and Wang, 1981), 35-36.  
18 St. Petersburg Times, March 3, 1960. 
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Webb‟s informed Floyd the store had run out of counter checks, the 
demonstrators moved on to S.H. Kress. The story there was the same. Kress 
closed its counters and waited for the students to leave.
19
         
Unlike in Tallahassee, St. Petersburg‟s first brush with lunch counter 
desegregation barely registered on the social barometer. Everyone- from activists 
to waitresses to white customers and police officers- remained calm and civil. 
Business owners, however, took notice. Webb‟s City owner, Doc Webb, issued a 
written statement that blamed the sit-ins on outside agitators. Webb, who 
employed more than 100 blacks but in the lowliest positions, considered himself 
“a friend” of the black community and believed the” demonstrations were 
condoned,” by only “a few of the city‟s Negroes.”  Later, when demonstrations 
returned to Webb‟s City, Webb-once again took a paternalistic posture that 
refused to acknowledge the necessity of change.
20
   
Despite Webb‟s bewilderment, the sit-ins appeared to work. Mayor 
Brantley initially balked at the idea of a biracial committee, saying: “There is no 
need to appoint a committee for the purpose of alleviating a condition that does 
not in fact exist.” But pressure from an interracial group of clergymen led 
Brantley to reconsider. “It might be well to have a biracial committee to assist in 
continuing the present relationship and understanding that does exist,” he later 
acknowledged. The creation of such a committee in Tampa had already led to a 
                                               
19 St. Petersburg Times, March 4, 1960.  
20 St. Petersburg Times, March 5, 1960. 
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moratorium on sit-in demonstrations, and leaders in St. Petersburg hoped for a 
similar outcome.
21
  
         As negotiations over lunch counter desegregation began, black leaders 
shifted their focus to education. Six years after the Brown decision students in St. 
Petersburg and throughout most of Pinellas County still attended racially separate 
schools. As part of the state‟s plan to circumvent the Brown decision, individual 
school districts were given expansive powers to dictate the pace of desegregation. 
Instead of complying, the Pinellas County Board of Public Instruction acted as if, 
in the words of historian Gordon K. Mantler, “separate but really equal” would 
suffice. The county built new segregated schools and rejected black applicants to 
all-white institutions.
22
     
 Brown did, however, resuscitate the local NAACP branch, which in its 
early years had had concentrated on voter registration. When Ralph Wimbish 
became branch president in 1959, the St. Petersburg NAACP took the lead in 
local desegregation efforts. A graduate of Gibbs High School, Wimbish received 
a bachelor‟s degree from Florida A&M College and an M.D. from Meharry 
Medical College. In 1952, Wimbish, along with his wife C. Bette, returned to St. 
Petersburg and the couple almost immediately dove into social activism. While 
his wife led voter registration drives, Ralph formed the Ambassador‟s Club, a 
fraternal society that listed the most prominent and wealthy members of the black 
community on its roster. After helping initiate the CCC, Wimbish and a few 
                                               
21 St. Petersburg Times, April 15, 1960. 
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fellow members challenged the segregation policies at the Pasadena Golf Course 
in 1954. Rather than integrate the course, local leaders sold it to private owners.
23
   
 Six years later, though still smarting from the Pasadena episode, the 
Wimbishes developed an innovative political approach to school desegregation. If 
they could not force the school board to comply with Brown, they would integrate 
the school board first. On March 5, 1960 C. Bette Wimbish announced her 
candidacy for the “at-large” seat on the Pinellas County Board of Public 
Instruction. The “Wimbish for School Board” campaign was the first of its kind in 
Pinellas County. Never before had a black candidate run for a countywide 
political office. Operating out of the NAACP offices on 22nd St. S., Wimbish was 
well-suited to challenging the white hegemony in county politics. Having earned a 
degree from Florida A&M University, before doing graduate work at the 
University of Pennsylvania, and having worked as an teacher in the Hillsborough 
County School system, she had strong credentials as an educator. Moreover, she 
“had no fears of reprisals.” “No one could do anything to me,” she remembered, 
“my husband was a physician, self-sustained in the black community.”24  
 From the start, Wimbish “knew” she could not win. But she hoped to 
establish a political beachhead and to disrupt traditional arrangements, If only by 
using “the campaign process to access places like parks during rallies that blacks 
were not permitted to go.” Wimbish ran on a platform opposed to the practice of 
“duplicate spending,” the doubly excessive cost of funding racially separate 
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schools. But considering herself “a mother first and foremost,” she fought a larger 
fight for her children and those in the black community who had no “chance.”25  
 Despite receiving nearly 10,000 votes in the primary, Wimbish failed to 
unseat the incumbent, Dr. William Casler of Clearwater. While she fell far short 
of Casler‟s 25,000 votes, her vote revealed pockets of progressivism throughout 
the county. Blacks only composed 3,798 of the registered voters in the county 
which means more than 6,000 whites cast votes for Wimbish. With more than 
70% of her support coming from white voters, she considered the race “a moral 
victory,” a “path finding effort” that will make it much “easier for those that 
follow.”26  
 The success sparked a greater concentration on voter registration within 
the local black community, as Wimbish and her supporters set out to register as 
many new voters as they could before the November elections. The Non-partisan 
Voters League kicked off a house-to-house canvass to reach those whose jobs 
prevented them from getting to the registrar‟s office during the day. Although St. 
Petersburg‟s black voters failed to determine any elections, the November return 
revealed the possibility of increasing the black electorate unprecedented levels. In 
1960, a significant number of St. Petersburg blacks switched to the Republican 
Party to vote for a moderate gubernatorial candidate, George C. Petersen, who 
was challenging the Democrat Farris Bryant, an arch segregationist. In Pinellas 
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precinct 61, home to 1,247 black voters and only 114 whites, Petersen nearly 
doubled Bryant‟s tally of 255 votes. Statewide Bryant won the election handily 
and soon set out to separate himself from the outgoing Governor Leroy Collins. 
As Governor, Bryant failed to reactivate Collin‟s state biracial committee and 
reaffirmed his opposition to racial integration at every opportunity.
27
  
The presidential election was a different story. The black voters who 
backed Petersen at the state level preferred the Democratic presidential candidate 
John F. Kennedy over Republican Richard M. Nixon. With blacks across the 
nation throwing their support behind Kennedy, the Democrat eked out a narrow 
victory. 
  By the winter of 1960 racial progress seemed at a standstill. The biracial 
committee had met only a few times and done nothing, and Brantley‟s stipulation 
that the committee act only as a mediating body rendered it almost powerless. In 
October, officials from Woolworth‟s, Kress, and McCrory‟s announced the 
integration of their lunch counters in Bradenton, Largo, Sarasota, Tampa, and Fort 
Myers, which only crystallized the St. Petersburg biracial committee‟s 
ineffectiveness. The only active racial issue involved efforts to reform the city‟s 
hospital facilities.
28
   
Since January 1960, city officials had been exploring ways of improving 
local hospital facilities. City Manager George K. Armes organized a committee of 
the city‟s leading physicians to survey the deficiencies plaguing the all-black 
Mercy Hospital and to recommend solutions. The hospital, built in 1926, routinely 
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fell short of covering its monthly operating costs, because of inadequate health 
insurance in the black community. On average, those admitted to Mercy carried 
policies paying anywhere between three and fifteen dollars a day, well below the 
$30/day the typical patient cost the hospital. Furthermore, Mercy lacked proper 
instruments, bed space, and adequate staffing. The x-ray machines were 
unreliable, and doctors at Mercy often endured long waits to secure blood from 
the blood bank at the whites-only Mound Park Hospital. When Armes‟ 
investigative committee recommended building a new, racially segregated Mercy 
hospital adjacent to Mound Park, the city council concurred, voting to spend $1.7 
million for the construction of the new unit.
29
    
What initially seemed like a simple solution, and to city administrators, an 
admirable gesture towards the black community, soon became a source of 
contention and foot dragging. For nine months groups with competing interests 
fought tooth and nail over the proper handling of the “Mercy situation.” The 
Mound Park Advisory Board-essentially a white citizen‟s council with a more 
official sounding name-opposed the investigative committee‟s proposal, arguing 
for the remodeling of Mercy on its present site.
30
  
When it looked as though the city was going to bend to the Advisory 
Board‟s demands, black doctors sent a letter to city council threatening to 
“boycott Mercy.” They even vowed to send their patients to Mound Park if the 
Advisory Board got its way. “We are well aware of the procedure of the city 
fathers in previous years,” the letter read, “give the Negroes a little and they will 
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quiet down for 10 or 15 years.” Forewarned, Armes and the city council went 
back to the drawing board and eventually agreed to add an integrated wing to 
Mound Park while continuing to keep Mercy open. In response, the all-white 
Mound Park Civic Association condemned the new plan and circulated a petition 
to block all hospital integration. Unsure how to proceed, the city council promised 
to come up with a new plan by the first of the year. Black doctors formulated a 
boycott strategy and took a “wait and see stand.” Ralph Wimbish and the NAACP 
were heartened by the doctor‟s stand, but the NAACP was preoccupied with other 
issues at the time.
31
 
In November 1960, the NAACP and the CCC planned a selective buying 
campaign to protest lunch counter segregation and the discriminatory policies at 
department stores. National NAACP executive secretary Roy Wilkins had 
encouraged branches to conduct “patronage withdrawals” against chain and 
variety stores throughout the spring, but the St. Petersburg branch did not respond 
to his plea until November. With the Christmas shopping season already in full 
swing, the air was ripe for such a project. An executive committee composed of 
leaders from the NAACP and the CCC outlined a list of “target stores.” The 
NAACP also planned to bolster the campaign with-direct action demonstrations 
that would involve the formation of youth council involved. After getting a taste 
of the sit-ins in March, local college and high school students had grown restless. 
During the summer, Gibbs high graduate David Isom, fed up with the 
conservative NAACP leadership, formed an “unofficial” youth council, and led 
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sporadic swim-ins at Spa Beach and several lunch counter sit-ins. Isom left for 
college in September and the youth council fell apart. In preparation for the 
upcoming demonstrations, NAACP member Leon Cox Jr. organized the branch‟s 
first “official” youth council. To the dismay of Gibbs Jr. College president 
Jonathon Rembert, Cox, a professor of political science, recruited volunteers from 
his classes.
32
 
When rumors leaked of the plans in St. Petersburg, the Congress of Racial 
Equality joined the fold. CORE‟s newest Florida chapter formed in the living 
room of Ike Williams, one of St. Petersburg‟s two black attorneys, during a 
meeting between CCC officials and CORE field secretary Richard Haley. 
Although a significant force in movements in Miami and Tallahassee, CORE 
struggled to gain traction in St. Petersburg. As much as the white establishment, 
black leaders resented encroachment from outside organizations. After its 
formation, CORE joined the selective buying campaign in a limited capacity, and, 
along with the youth council, supplied the bulk of the demonstrators for the direct 
action protests.
33
   
To spread the word and garner support for the upcoming campaign, the 
NAACP held rallies at churches and in vacant lots throughout the black 
community. On November 27, the patronage withdrawal from select stores began, 
followed days later by direct-action protests. On the first day of demonstrations 
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there was “a buzz around Gibbs high,” remembered one volunteer, “. . .who was 
going, where is everyone meeting beforehand?” Around 5 p.m. on December 2, 
close to 30 protesters picketed Webb‟s City, and another 15 demonstrators waved 
signs and passed out handbills at Maas. Bros. Inside Webb‟s, protesters sat in at 
the lunch counters. In front of “counter closed” signs, next to white customers 
sipping coffee, black bus boys collecting dirty dishes from white patrons, Theodor 
Floyd of CORE and NAACP Youth Council president Ted Lockhart were denied 
service. That evening, picketers targeted white-owned liquor stores in the black 
community, protesting discriminatory hiring policies.
34
  
For three days the demonstrations continued. Although picketers heard the 
occasional racial epithet, they received little in the way of physical affronts. 
Waitresses at the lunch counters refused to serve the black customers, but never 
asked them to leave and did not make a scene. At one point, the police got 
involved when several sign-toting youths burst through the doors of Webb‟s City. 
In a deposition taken later, Doc Webb claimed the picketers “shoved and jostled” 
customers and threatened black employees with bodily harm. One man in the 
melee, Jack Morrison Jr., went to jail for blocking the entrance to Webb‟s and not 
letting customers pass. On another occasion, former Ku Klux Klan Wizard Bill 
Hendrix arrived in St. Petersburg pulling a trailer with “signs depicting tribal 
Negroes in Africa” and the words “get out of town‟” written on the side. Chief 
Purdy caught up with Hendrix before he reached downtown and asked him to turn 
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around. After a few exchanges, Hendrix told Purdy that he would “make a fine 
Klansman,” and left town.35  
 Regardless of Purdy‟s alleged Klan qualifications, he and his men played a large 
role in keeping the peace. Since becoming chief in 1958, Purdy had helped repair the 
historically troubled relationship between the black community and a mostly white police 
force. To handle the demonstrations, Purdy sent only black officers to the scene, keeping 
white patrolmen on backup alert. The mild nature of the demonstrations required little 
police intervention, and the officers wisely refrained from provoking a confrontation.
36
  
 Nevertheless, an enraged Doc Webb single-handily ended the protests. By noon 
on December 7, Webb‟s attorney had obtained a restraining order against the NAACP 
and within an hour the protests at Webb‟s City came to a halt. Citing the loss of $45,000 
in revenue during what Webb considered “malicious and violent” picketing, the 
injunction dealt the selective buying campaign a mortal blow. The demonstrations at 
Maas. Bros. ended the next day. NAACP lawyers Fred Minnis and Ike Williams 
immediately filed a motion to dissolve the injunction, and Williams warned that the 
picketing would resume if negotiations failed to reach a settlement.
37
  
  Like Doc Webb, city leaders had seen enough. Biracial committee chair Dr. Earl 
Edington convened a series of negotiations between chain store proprietors and NAACP 
executives that finally led to a settlement. To avoid the perception that outsiders 
influenced the situation, both sides agreed to wait a few weeks, until January 3, to 
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announce the desegregation of the lunch counters. The NAACP ended all demonstrations 
but kept the selective buying campaign active until the first of the year. Days later 
NAACP State conference president A. Leon Lowry almost ruined everything. In a press 
release, Lowry celebrated the “NAACP‟s successful” campaign in St. Petersburg--exactly 
the type of imputation leaders of both sides hoped to avoid. Lowry‟s misstep, however, 
proved harmless.
38
  
 On January 3, 1961, fifteen stores in greater St. Petersburg, including Kress, 
Maas. Bros., and Woolworth‟s, dropped their segregation policies. Webb‟s City followed 
suit the same day. Fannye Ayer Ponder, Ruth McClellan, and Enoch received invitations 
to lunch at Webb‟s City. Webb, however, pressed on with an injunctive suit against the 
NAACP to, in his words, “prove a point.” Circuit Court Judge Jack White denied the 
NAACP‟s motion to dissolve the injunction, forcing them to scramble to find the money 
for an appeal. Minnis contacted the NAACP Legal Defense Fund for help. Upon 
reviewing the details, Defense Fund attorney Robert L. Carter believed the case “was one 
of the best” the NAACP would “get in this kind of situation,” and agreed to foot the 
$2,500 appeal fee and fly to St. Petersburg to assist.
39
 
 As the racial tension seemed to ease, the hotels began to fill in anticipation of 
spring training baseball, presenting a glaring dilemma for Ralph Wimbish. For years he 
and other black leaders had helped find lodgings for black professional baseball players 
in town for spring training. As the most visible leader of the local struggle, Wimbish 
could not “battle for the integration of lunch counters with one hand,” as he explained at 
a press conference, “and further the cause of segregation by arranging separate housing 
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with the other.” Spring training baseball, however, was a tradition in St. Petersburg 
almost as old as segregation itself, and few city leaders and hotel proprietors felt the need 
for change.
40
   
  The first Major League Baseball teams arrived in St. Petersburg in 1914. By 
1961, thirteen of the league‟s eighteen teams trained in Florida, seven in the Tampa Bay 
area, including the New York Yankees and the St. Louis Cardinals in St. Petersburg. 
Long after the desegregation of Major League Baseball in 1947, writes historian Jack 
Davis, “racial policies in the spring training season continued to reflect Southern social 
patterns.” In St. Petersburg, white players for both teams stayed on the waterfront at the 
Vinoy Hotel or at the Soreno. Black players, on the other hand, rented rooms from dentist 
Robert Swain at the James Motel; others, including all-star catcher Elston Howard, stayed 
with the Wimbishes. And the segregated atmosphere did not stop there: the stadiums had 
segregated seating sections, restaurants and night clubs, social gatherings and recreational 
facilities banned black players, even those who were household names across the country. 
For white teammates, the several weeks in Florida were vacation time, but for black 
players, it was often a sort of penance.
41
  
 State NAACP officials gave Wimbish full support and sent letters to teams 
training in Florida, urging an “end to the problem of racial bias.” Although teams trained 
all across the southern part of the state, everyone waited to see what the Yankees would 
do. “If the St. Petersburg hotels had given in to Dan Topping‟s demands,” said one 
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hospitality executive, “we would have followed suit.” New York general manager Dan 
Topping met with the St. Petersburg chamber of commerce and hotel management to 
work out a “one-roof” solution, but no hotel would budge. Major League Baseball 
refused to get involved, putting little pressure on the state to intervene, essentially leaving 
the policies intact. White players stayed at the Vinoy and Soreno hotels anyway.
42
  
 While most teams waited till the following season to address the problem, several 
bucked the trend. When the White Sox, who trained in Sarasota, traveled to Miami to 
play the Orioles, their president, Bill Veeck, canceled his club‟s reservations at the 
McAllister Hotel when it would not allow his black players. Soon after, the Braves 
integrated the seating at their stadium in Bradenton and removed racially discriminatory 
signs from the facility. The following year many teams, including the Cardinals and the 
incoming New York Mets, secured integrated housing. St. Petersburg‟s Al Lang Stadium 
integrated the grandstands for spring training in 1962, but many of the city‟s hotels 
continued to ban black guests.
43
 
 After the dissolution of the selective buying campaign movement leaders put the 
brakes on desegregation efforts to focus on securing more job opportunities for the black 
community. The election of Mayor Herman Goldner in 1961 represented a step in that 
direction. During his campaign, Goldner had promised to hire more blacks in civil jobs 
like meter-readers and bus drivers, and to reform the city‟s biracial committee, which had 
gone defunct when the lunch counters desegregated. “As long as the climate and 
atmosphere of St. Petersburg is one of positive action-and that appears to be the case,” 
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explained NAACP executive Louis O. Harper, “the [NAACP] intends to try to negotiate 
further gains without en masse protests. . .” The easing of tensions came as the broader 
civil rights movement heated up. Sit-ins and other forms of direct action protests had 
revived massive resistance throughout the South, and the racial tensions would only 
intensify over the next two years--even in cities like St. Petersburg where movement 
leader seemed to favor diplomatic solutions to their social qualms. Indeed, as the baseball 
players and snowbirds headed north, a new form of agitation threatened St. Petersburg‟s 
peaceful interregnum.
44
  
 In May 1961, direct-action forms of civil disobedience went on the road. After the 
Supreme Court extended a 1946 decision (Morgan v. Virginia) banning segregation on 
interstate traveling buses to cover terminals (Boynton v. Virginia), CORE organized the 
Freedom Rides.  Aboard Greyhound and Trailways buses, black and white civil rights 
activists trained in Gandhian nonviolence rode through the Deep South, testing the 
region‟s compliance with the new ruling. After the first wave of rides ended were 
disrupted by Klansman and other white supremacist hoodlums in Anniston and 
Birmingham, Alabama, student activists in Nashville, Tennessee, picked up where the 
CORE riders left off. The Nashville Riders, consisting mainly of students from Fisk and 
Tennessee State Universities, rode into the heart of darkness as far as Mississippi. Forced 
to respond to the violent beatings of defenseless Freedom Riders in Montgomery and 
Birmingham, the Kennedy administration made a deal with Mississippi Senator James 
Eastland that the Defense Department would allow law enforcement officials to arrest the 
riders as long as they were protected from mob violence. Kennedy had ridden into office 
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on a wave of black support, but his preoccupation with Cold War foreign policy led him 
to neglect the black freedom struggle and to view the Freedom Rides as a diversion from 
Cold War imperatives.
45
    
 Historians credit the Freedom Rides with reinvigorating the black civil rights 
movement and exposing the depth of racism in the Deep South, but at a cost. The 
Kennedy administration‟s reluctant and ultimately ineffectual action to protect the Riders 
emboldened white extremists and alienated black leaders. Moreover, the Freedom Riders, 
as historian Raymond Arsenault has pointed out, “evoked vivid memories of meddling 
abolitionists and invading armies.” “This was especially true in the white South,” 
explains Arsenault, “where a resurgent „siege mentality‟ was in full force in the post-
Brown era.”46       
 By the time word of impending Freedom Rides to Florida reached Governor 
Bryant in June, the movement had peaked. Nevertheless, Bryant sent an aid to warn 
targeted cities, suggesting the Riders should be left alone. As in the past, the fear of 
outside agitators extended to black leaders, too. In St. Petersburg, the NAACP “didn‟t 
want outside groups to come in and do things local groups could do.” A “quiet check” of 
the bus terminals revealed no problems. The Freedom Riders came anyway. Two buses 
road into St. Petersburg on June 15, the first about 1 p.m., carrying seven Freedom 
Riders, three whites and four blacks. More than two hundred spectators showed up at the 
Greyhound station to witness their arrival. Chief Purdy felt “a busload of people. . .does 
not in itself constitute an emergency situation,” yet he stationed trained riot police at the 
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terminal. As the Riders disembarked from the bus, local resident Robert Bierl unleashed a 
string of verbal taunts. After repeated warnings, officers eventually arrested him. The 
incident with Bierl, however, was an anomaly. “The trip was very successful,” 
commented Francis Randall, a white Rider and history professor from Columbia 
University, “there was much less opposition, much less refusal of service than I 
expected.”47 
 Freedom Riders in Tallahassee and Ocala were not so lucky. Law enforcement 
officials in the state capital defied the governor, accusing the Riders-an interracial group 
of Protestant ministers and two Jewish Rabbis-of inciting a mob, and took them to jail. In 
Ocala, a fight led to several arrests. Stops in Gainesville and Tampa on the other hand, 
met with no resistance. On his experiences in Florida, a Freedom Rider remarked: “I 
gained a greater respect and greater understanding for the South and recognize that what 
happened in Birmingham was not representative of Southern attitudes.”Two days after a 
“workshop” at Rev. Enoch Davis‟s Second Bethel Baptist Church, where the Freedom 
Riders reactivated the local CORE chapter, the outside agitators hopped a flight home to 
New York.
48
  
  Hoping to calm the storm wrought by the Freedom Riders, the Justice Department 
urged national civil rights leaders to focus their efforts on the franchise. The NAACP, 
CORE, SNCC, and SCLC all began voter registration projects throughout the South, 
including St. Petersburg, where leaders had already proclaimed a halt to direct-action 
demonstrations. For the rest of the summer the revived CORE chapter and NAACP youth 
                                               
47 Rabby, The Pain and the Promise, 135; St. Petersburg Times, June 4, 1961, June 13, 1961, June 16, 
1961, June 13, 1961, June 18, 1961, and June 16, 1961.   
48 St. Petersburg Times, June 1961; Walter Barnes, interview by author, November 30, 2009; St. Petersburg 
Times, June 18, 1961.  
31 
 
council concentrated on voter registration.
49
  
*** 
 Not everyone in the NAACP agreed with the executive council‟s decision to halt 
direct-action protests. Since the end of the selective buying campaign, Leon Cox had 
envisioned the Youth Council picketing the segregated movie theaters downtown. When 
Cox replaced Wimbish as branch president, he got his opportunity.
50
  
 Five of St. Petersburg‟s eight movie theaters catered to blacks customers. In fact, 
one of the nicest theaters in town, Park Theater, with air conditioning and central heat, 
cushioned leather chairs, carpeted aisles, had integrated a year earlier. But three 
downtown theaters-the Center, State, and Florida-only allowed whites.
51
 
 To prepare for the demonstrations, the youth council received training in 
nonviolent direct-action. Cox appointed Gibbs Junior College student Arnette Doctor 
Youth Council president, replacing Ted Lockhart, who had clashed with Cox over the 
direction the group would take in the aftermath of the selective buying campaign. Doctor 
could not have been more enthusiastic about Cox‟s plans, though he “didn‟t believe in 
nonviolence.” As a kid growing up in the dilapidated, crime ridden, Jordan Park public 
housing community, Doctor developed a deep distrust for whites--one instilled in him by 
his mother. Philomena Doctor had fled from Rosewood, Florida, in 1923 during one of 
the state‟s worst episodes of racial violence. From a young age Doctor learned of his 
family‟s travails and kept the stories close to his heart, harboring little patience for 
indignities suffered at the hands of white people. Nevertheless, Doctor believed the 
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movement was “more important” than himself and did his best to remain nonviolent.52  
 On January 11, 1962, more than twenty youths, boys dressed in slacks and sport 
coats, girls in skirts and blouses, stood in line at the segregated theaters downtown, 
holding signs and attempting to purchase tickets. The harmless demonstrations did little 
more than irritate theater managers, though some Youth Council members reported 
verbal abuse and a few claimed to have been spit upon. But most whites simply ignored 
them. On one occasion at the Florida Theater a few whites bought tickets for the 
demonstrators, but the theater would not honor them, offering a refund not admission. For 
nearly ten days Doctor and his band shook off the humiliation and resisted temptations to 
retaliate. But on January 19, the center would not hold.
53
 
 At the Center Theater, the only place in town showing “King of Kings,” the story 
of Christ, theater staff had erected an eight-foot barrier to block the entrance. Around 
7:30 p.m., usher Cecil Fernandez Jr. removed a chain to allow a line of whites into the 
theatre. Seizing the opportunity, demonstrators barreled through the aperture and scaled 
the wrought iron barrier, knocking Fernandez into a fence and cutting his hand. Another 
usher, William Fuerst, did his best to hold back the surging crowd, but several slipped by, 
plowing through the ticket line.
54
  
 In the melee a white man in his sixties approached Doctor wielding a .45 caliber 
revolver and placed the barrel of the gun to his head. “Nigger,” the man shouted, “if you 
don‟t get your ass out of here, your brains are gonna be splattered all over the sidewalk.” 
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From the corner of his eye Doctor saw police officers, but they just looked on. As he 
stared the man, images of Rosewood running through his head, Doctor reached for a 
pistol tucked in his back pocket. But Doctor thought better of the potential deadly move 
and pulled his hand away. Moments later, police clad in riot gear moved in, and Doctor‟s 
assailant disappeared into the night. Within a few minutes law enforcement had the 
situation under control. But before officers loaded him into a paddy wagon along with the 
rest of the male demonstrators, Doctor passed his weapon off to one of the female 
demonstrators that the police had allowed to go home. Ten Youth Council members-
Arnette Doctor, Artis Livingston, Jimmy L. Swain, Harvey L. Hammonds, Earl Williams, 
Ruby L. Hollins, Vernon Kearns, Joseph W. Lampkins, Eli C. Williams, and Titus A. 
Robinson-were released on $500 bond with trials set for later that month.
55
 
 NAACP field secretary Robert Saunders called the arrests the “worst kind of 
apartheid” in meeting at Second Bethel Baptist Church. Saunders vowed to keep the 
demonstrations alive, urging others to join in and promising “as sure as night follows day, 
the Negro shall be allowed to sit. . . in St. Petersburg theaters.” But contrary to 
Saunders‟s prediction, the arrests actually doomed the demonstrations.56        
 At the trials, city prosecutor Allan Weiss argued that the demonstrators‟ behavior 
constituted a breach of the peace. Police Sgt. George Brown confirmed Weiss‟s claim, 
saying the situation had bordered on a “riot.” The ten defendants, represented by 
attorneys Fred Minnis and Ike Williams, denied the charges. In his closing statement, 
Minnis remarked: “If you strip this case of all subterfuge it would simply be whether or 
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not it is. . .  disorderly act for a Negro to seek to see King of Kings. . . the only place it is 
being shown in the area.”57 
 Initially, Municipal Judge Henry Esteva fined the defendants $50 each, but he 
later suspended the fines when Minnis promised the “harassment” would cease. Judge 
Esteva‟s ruling only pertained to the ten defendants, but the NAACP, almost bankrupted 
by the legal fees, could not afford to continue the demonstrations.
58
  
 The disastrous end to the picketing fractured the local movement. Pressured by 
school board Superintendent Floyd T. Christian, Gibbs Junior College President Jonathan 
Rembert fired Cox and stripped Doctor of his scholarship. By September, Cox had left 
for a job at Fisk University in Nashville, Tennessee. In his final months as NAACP 
president, Cox led a countywide voter registration drive and officially requested the city 
of St. Petersburg to enact “ a bill that will ensure all of the citizens of St. Petersburg the 
rights granted every other citizen in the city.” One might ask, as Stokley Carmichael did, 
“What could be more harmless. . .in any even marginally healthy society?” 
Unfortunately, Mayor Goldner washed his hands of the situation: “We do not feel that it 
is proper for the city to interfere with the operations of private business in this area. It is 
suggested this is a matter of community conscience and the problem can best be handled 
on a non-governmental level.”59 
*** 
 More than a year passed before the NAACP returned to the movie theaters. By 
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then the optimism of 1962 had vanished. Goldner‟s promises to expand job opportunities 
for blacks and reactivate the city‟s biracial committee never materialized. And not only 
the movie theaters retained segregation. Restaurants throughout the city, including the 
cafeteria at Webb‟s City, still refused to serve black patrons. What had seemed like 
“positive action” to men like Louis O. Harper in 1962 now looked like the same old “feet 
dragging.”60  
 In the summer of 1963 the NAACP was still financially in the red, but the Youth 
Council was riding high. Over six weeks, as part of the nationwide “Crusade for Voter 
Registration Campaign,” Youth Council members registered 1,041 new voters, the most 
in the country, earning the group an award and an invitation to the NAACP‟s national 
conference in Chicago. The success also encouraged council members to take on larger 
projects. When NAACP field secretary Robert Saunders shifted his focus to 
desegregating the movie theaters in Tampa, the St. Petersburg youth council revived such 
efforts at home. However, since the departure of Cox, the insolvent NAACP had fallen 
under the control of the CCC. Rev. J.L. Fennell, former branch president and then vice 
president of the CCC, had taken it upon himself to resuscitate the NAACP, and the 
organization was just getting back on its feet when the issue of picketing movie theaters 
resurfaced. With the NAACP‟s coffers empty and Fennell preoccupied with his pastoral 
and CCC, the Youth Council received little support from the adults.
61
 
 Fortunately, Elenora Adams stepped in to fill the leadership void. A member of 
the NAACP branch since 1962 and a volunteer participant during the 1961 efforts to 
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integrate the lunch counters, Adams took unofficial control of the Youth Council when 
Leon Cox became branch president. After Cox left for Nashville and the NAACP 
essentially fell apart, Adams kept the council alive and ran it independently of the CCC. 
During the “Crusade for Voter Registration” she recruited white students from Florida 
Presbyterian College to join the council. Adams‟ assertiveness brought success to the 
registration campaign but it also soured her relationship with men like Fennell. When 
NAACP and CCC executives showed tepid support for the theater idea, Adams again 
took matters into her own hands.
62
 
 Meanwhile, events in Tampa suggested a renewed theater picketing campaign 
was imminent. On June 20, after a meeting between Robert Saunders and representatives 
of Florida Theater Inc. failed to reach a settlement, the NAACP‟s Tampa branch 
launched protest demonstrations. Hoping to avoid a similar situation, St. Petersburg 
business and political leaders took action. First, the board of governors of the St. 
Petersburg Chamber of Commerce passed a resolution calling for “all persons and 
institutions to face up to the moral responsibility of equal rights for all.” In addition, four 
members of the Ministerial Association and the Council of Human Relations met with 
Vice Mayor Nortney Cox to discuss the hiring of more blacks in city jobs and the 
necessity of a new biracial committee. “We are facing a racial crisis in our community,” 
warned a minister from the Council of Human Relations in a meeting with local theater 
proprietors. But the owners would not budge.
63
   
 As the demonstrations began in Tampa, the St. Petersburg NAACP branch held a 
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meeting at Fennell‟s New Hope Missionary Baptist Church to vote on whether or not to 
follow suit. While the executive board debated the issue downstairs, steering committee 
chairpersons Elenora Adams and Howard Harris rehearsed nonviolent protest strategies 
with Youth Council members upstairs. The executives voted to authorize the 
demonstrations, and on June 21, 1968, a year and half after the last go around, picketers 
returned to the Center, Florida, and State theaters.
64
  
 Under Adams‟s leadership, the nature of the demonstrations took on a different 
tone than those in 1962. She required all participants to sign in each night before they 
could demonstrate, and all newcomers had to know someone else involved or they would 
not be permitted to join. Every night before picketing resumed, the Youth Council met at 
New Hope Baptist to “critique” the previous night‟s activities or “reprimand individuals 
for harassing the ticket seller.” Participants included middle-aged white men and women 
carrying signs in one hand and holding their children‟s hands in the other.  The timbre of 
the demonstrations and diversity of participants, not to mention the earlier efforts of the 
Chamber of Commerce, reflected the shifting winds in the city‟s racial climate.65  
 Behind the scenes, groups worked tirelessly to desegregate the theaters and end 
the need for protests. Consistently rebuffed by theater owners, the Council of Human 
Relations formed its own interracial negotiating body. Not to be out done, Mayor 
Goldner organized his own biracial committee. But in the end, neither group proved 
capable of bringing the issue to a close. Quietly, and under the radar, without the 
knowledge of NAACP executives, Adams and the Youth Council members met with the 
Chamber of Commerce and theater owners and ultimately reached a settlement. With 
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desegregation accomplished, Adams halted the demonstrations for good on July 26.
66
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Chapter Three: The Lawyer and the Loose Cannon 
 Following the integration of St. Petersburg‟s movie theaters, the focus of the 
movement returned to the courtroom. In 1964, Jim Sanderlin, a young black attorney two 
years out of law school, sued the Pinellas County Board of Public Instruction for failing 
to comply with Brown v. Board of Education, the 1954 Supreme Court ruling outlawing 
segregation. At the time, only two percent of the county‟s black students attended school 
with whites. For ten years the school board had managed to avoid such a lawsuit while 
thwarting all but the most token desegregation. In 1966, two years after Sanderlin filed 
suit, a young black activist in St. Petersburg, Joseph A. Waller, sat in court facing the 
possibility of five years in prison for an impetuous act of lawlessness. Penalized for his 
militancy, Waller had been subjected to a protracted legal battle symbolized the onset of 
white backlash in the late 1960s. A study in contrast, Sanderlin and Waller were the 
leading voices in the local struggle for black equality. Sanderlin‟s legal activism and his 
commitment to nonviolence fit well within the upper ranks of the city‟s conservative 
black leadership. Waller, on the other hand, led a militant counter movement that 
reflected growing dissatisfaction and frustration within the black community.
1
   
 The rise of both men to local prominence mirrored a larger cleave in the national 
civil rights narrative. Years of federal inaction and modest advances bread 
disillusionment and infighting amongst movement leaders. The nonviolent struggle 
peaked in 1963, when more than 200,000 people gathered on the steps of the Lincoln 
Memorial as part of the March on Washington for Jobs and Freedom. Three months after 
the march, with Martin Luther King Jr.‟s “I have a Dream,” speech still echoing across 
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the nation, President Kennedy died at the hands of an assassin. Over the next two years, 
President Lyndon B. Johnson completed the work his slain predecessor had begun, 
signing into law the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and the Voting Rights Act of 1965. More 
than one hundred years after emancipation, black Americans had finally achieved civic 
equality with whites, if only in the eyes of the law.
2
   
 For many disillusioned blacks, however, it was too late. Over the next five years a 
rising tide of black militancy converged with a flood of antiwar sentiment and social 
unrest. Riots erupted across the country, threatening the fabric of American civilization 
and endangering the myths that had for so long defined national identity. In St. 
Petersburg, Sanderlin and Waller represented the diverging expressions of the black 
struggle. Their parallel and oft-intertwined sagas reveal not only their triumphs and 
failures as individuals, but also the shifting social and political...that framed the civil 
rights struggle of the 1960s.
3
  
*** 
 “White and colored children shall not be taught in the same school,” read 
Florida‟s 1885 constitution. Nine years later the U.S. Supreme Court validated this 
provision in Plessy v. Ferguson, ruling separate facilities for blacks and whites did not 
violate the “due process” clause of the Fourteenth Amendment so long as said facilities 
were “equal.” Combined with the efforts of Southern legislators, who between 1880 and 
1900 devised new state constitutions that effectively disfranchised blacks and poor 
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whites, Plessy formed the legal foundation of Southern Jim Crowism for the next fifty-
eight years.
4
   
 St. Petersburg‟s first black family, the Donaldsons, sent their children to school 
with whites in the mid-1880s, when the community was still a frontier settlement. But as 
St. Petersburg‟s population grew, Jim Crow restrictions emerged, creating the need for an 
all-black school. In 1914, Davis Academy opened, followed in 1925 by Jordan 
Elementary. Separate, however, was never equal. In her study of Tallahassee, Glenda 
Rabby suggests the expense of operating a dual school system “contributed to the 
wretched quality” of education for “both races.” Blacks, of course, suffered 
disproportionately. Before the turn of the century the state spent $13.12 per black student 
as compared with $26.66 for whites. By 1910, the spending gap had increased. For every 
$9.95 spent on a black student, the state allocated $36.05 for white pupils. St. 
Petersburg‟s poorly-funded black schools offered no more than a sixth grade education. 
Students as well as instructors felt the heavy financial burdens. Teachers often canvassed 
neighborhoods on foot for donations and sometimes went without paychecks in the final 
months of the school year. The institutional infrastructure of black education in Florida 
reached a nadir during the Great Depression. In 1932, according to a report released by 
the state superintendent of schools, 24 percent of the state‟s black teachers lacked a high 
school diploma, and only two percent earned more than $1,000 a year.
5
     
 The depression had a paradoxical affect on black education in St. Petersburg. As 
funding dried up, doors opened. When the city‟s economy collapsed in 1926, a planned 
all-white elementary school sat empty. Local blacks successfully lobbied for use of the 
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facility, and in 1928, the first black high school, 34th St. School for Colored (renamed 
two years later to Jonathon C. Gibbs High School, after Reconstruction Florida‟s most 
prominent black politician), began holding classes for grades 5-12. When it opened, the 
school had no electrical lighting and the restrooms were designed for younger people. 
The office of the school‟s first principal, Samuel Reed, was in a custodial closet. Gibbs 
“offered the same curriculum as the white schools,” remembered former principle 
Emmanuel Stewart, but with “old textbooks that had been discarded and were outdated, 
old sewing machines and typewriters. . .the vocational shops were deplorable.” During 
Gibbs‟s first decade, there was no school bus for black students, many of whom had to 
walk miles to Gibbs, passing white schools along the way. When the school board turned 
down a request to supply Gibbs with a bus in 1939, principle George W. Perkins 
somehow raised the money to purchase one. Despite chronic underfunding and neglect by 
the county school board, Gibbs became the pride of the black community. Students 
destined to become community leaders “patterned” their lives after dedicated teachers 
like Olive B. McLin, Fannye Ayer Ponder, her adopted son Ernest A. Ponder, Ruby 
Wysinger, among others. By the beginning of World War II, a half dozen segregated 
black schools dotted the neighborhoods of South St. Petersburg, creating an expanding 
foundation for educational uplift.
6
  
 Despite the parlous economic conditions, the New Deal provided blacks with a 
measure of hope. “The Roosevelt administration,” writes historian Patricia Sullivan, 
“aimed to include blacks equitably in New Deal programs administered in the South.” 
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According to Sullivan, “Southern blacks began to view their plight within a national 
context and appeal for federal and national support in securing justice and equal rights.”7  
  One of the first blacks in St. Petersburg to take on the establishment was Noah 
Griffin. In 1937, Griffin, then president of St. Petersburg‟s branch of the NAACP, and 
principal of Gibbs high school, tried his hand at ending the salary disparities between 
white and black teachers. At the time, black teachers in Pinellas County earned half to 
one third the amount their white counterparts made. Prompted by NAACP attorney 
Thurgood Marshall‟s successful challenge of unequal pay for black teachers in Maryland, 
Griffin pressed the school board to change its policies. When the board ignored him, 
Griffin, with the Marshall‟s help, filed a lawsuit. Though ultimately unsuccessful, the suit 
made it to the Florida Supreme Court, where the justices upheld a lower court‟s decision, 
ruling that there was no legal basis with which to enforce pay scales upon school districts. 
To ward off other potential lawsuits, Pinellas County‟s superintendent of schools fired 
Griffin and five others involved with the suit. The dismissal ended Griffin‟s career as an 
educator in Florida, but this did not deter others from picking up the fight.
8
   
 Over the next decade black educators, many affiliated with the Florida State 
Teachers Association, in a wide range of Florida cities, from Pensecola to Ocala, to West 
Palm Beach, successfully forced their respective school boards to increase the salaries of 
black teachers. Locally, the Florida State Teacher‟s Union filed another lawsuit against 
the Pinellas County school board in 1942. Finally, in 1945, the board aquiesced.  By 
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1952, the income for black teachers had risen to $2,922, just below the $3,195 figure for 
whites.
9
   
 As Florida emerged from depression and war into postwar prosperity, the state 
launched a program to improve its lagging school system. Under governor Millard 
Caldwell, Florida passed the Minimum Foundations Act in 1947. Millions of dollars went 
into the construction of new schools, including funds aimed at fulfilling the “equal” part 
of the “separate but equal doctrine.” Before 1947, the capital outlay per student in Florida 
was $2.35 for blacks and $7.24 for whites. By 1952 those expenditures had become 
$68.78 and 59.84, respectively. Moreover, in 1945 the Florida board of control instituted 
a plan that funded thirty to forty scholarships for black students to attend college out of 
state.
10
   
  However benevolent such equalization efforts appeared to be, they mainly served 
to reinforce racial segregation, in the face of impending change. In 1954, after wiping out 
segregation at the graduate level four years earlier (Sweatt v. Painter/ Mclaurin v. 
Oklahoma, 1950), the U.S. Supreme Court outlawed racial segregation in the nation‟s 
public school system in Brown v. Board of Education. The decision came at an unusual 
time in Florida politics. Governor Dan McCarty had died two years earlier and the state 
was awaiting a special run-off election to replace the acting Governor Charley Johns, a 
staunch segregationist from the north Florida town of Starke, considered calling a special 
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session of the legislature to address the ruling, but decided against it, deferring to Senator 
Spessard Holland, who called for “patience and moderation.”11  
 Upon winning the state‟s special gubernatorial election, Leroy Collins took office 
six months after Brown. An avowed segregationist, Collins promised to do everything in 
his power to legally avoid complying with Brown. But Collins understood what many of 
his peers did not, that the only way to preserve Florida‟s prime economic industry, 
tourism, was to keep extremists on all sides at bay. Because the Supreme Court withheld 
a ruling regarding implementation of Brown until May 1965, Collins had plenty of time 
to draw up a “moderate” means of circumventing desegregation. The result was a devious 
plan for noncompliance developed by Florida‟s attorney general Richard Ervin.12    
 Following its monumental ruling, the Supreme Court asked several state to submit 
briefs with suggestions on the best ways to implement school desegregation. Ervin, in his 
amicus curiae submission, outlined a plan of gradual integration and urged the “the court 
to restrain the use of coercive measures where necessary until the hard core of public 
opinion has softened.” Ervin based much of the brief on a sociological study conducted 
by Florida State University professor Lewis Killian. Commissioned by Ervin, Killian‟s 
survey found, of those who responded, that 75 percent of blacks in Florida felt whites 
agreed with desegregation and, to the contrary, 75 percent of whites believed blacks 
supported segregation. In addition, Killian surveyed white policemen, and found that a 
large majority worried that desegregation would lead to violence. Ervin bolstered 
Killian‟s findings with sociological data of his own. He pointed to the high poverty and 
illiteracy rates of black Floridians to demonstrate the imperatives of his “gradualistic” 
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approach. Ervin essentially concluded that the socioeconomic status of blacks rendered 
desegregation hazardous to the overall well being of Florida‟s population. The brief, 
described by Brown scholar Richard Kluger as the “most extensive and spirited,” of all 
state briefs submitted to the Supreme Court, became the foundation for thwarting 
desegregation in Florida.
13
 
 On May 31, the Court announced its implementation plan for school 
desegregation, known as Brown II. At the urging of the Justice Department and Southern 
state officials, the Court set no immediate timetable and simply proposed that 
desegregation efforts move “with all deliberate speed.” The ambiguous “with all 
deliberate speed” was exactly what Collins and Ervin had hoped for. Indeed, Florida, was 
already on its way to formulating its own policy of handling desegregation. Several days 
before the Supreme Court announced Brown II, the state instituted a pupil placement law, 
a legislative manifestation of Ervin‟s “gradualistic” plan. The new law put the fate of 
school desegregation in the hands of local authorities and expanded the means by which 
school boards could avoid compliance.
14
  
 Brown II not only killed hopes for immediate desegregation, it also paved the way 
for massive white resistance in the South. In 1956, the separation of the races took center 
stage. With President Eisenhower refusing to push for more than token desegregation, 
opportunistic Southern politicians seized the moment by demagogically defending 
segregation. More than a hundred Southern congressmen-including Florida senators 
George Smathers and Spessard Holland- signed the “Southern Manifesto,” a document 
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pledging to resist all attempts to implement Brown. Pressure came from the bottom up as 
well. Southern public opinion polls taken at the time revealed that 80% of white 
Southerners opposed school desegregation.
15
  
 During the Gubernatorial election, Collins‟s political rivals seized the opportunity 
to attack his “weak” stance on segregation. To fend off his critics, Collins turned up the 
dial on his commitment to segregation, but he never quite matched opponent Sumter 
Lowry, who called for “one hundred percent” segregation. Although Lowry garnered 
more than 100,000 votes, the electorate ultimately preferred Collins‟s more temperate 
approach to noncompliance. Over the next four years the state‟s plan of gradualism and 
civil noncompliance effectively prevented meaningful school desegregation. By the time 
Collins left office in 1961, only one school, Orchid Villa elementary in Miami, had 
integrated its classrooms.
16
  
 Collins may have disagreed with Florida‟s more extreme political elements, but 
he had at least one thing in common with his rival and former governor, Charley Johns. 
Both men, for their own reasons, detested the NAACP. And in 1956, Collins gave 
Johns‟s Florida Legislative Investigative Committee (FLIC) the greenlight. The FLIC, 
later dubbed the Johns committee, performed the functions of a localized House Un-
American Activities Committee, tormenting any organization, person, or group, 
considered subversive. In its early years, the FLIC directed much of its harassment at the 
state NAACP and its branches, weakening their ability to fight for desegregation.
17
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 In Pinellas County, where Collins received 69% of the vote in 1956, one can see 
the perfect execution of “gradualism.” There “is nothing to get excited about,” 
admonished school board Superintendent Floyd T. Christian in response to the Brown 
decision. Christian predicted no “major changes.” For the next year local politicians and 
school board officials simply avoided discussing the issue.
18
  
 Christian did not, however, speak for everyone. St. Petersburg‟s black residents 
greeted the decision with a “absolute celebration,” remembered C. Bette Wimbish. Brown 
injected life into the struggling St. Petersburg branch of the NAACP, and with the help of 
state and national officials the branch began to formulate ways of enforcing 
desegregation. Another voice in the community, the St. Petersburg Times,  which had 
long championed school desegregation, suggested in an editorial that the city take the 
lead in complying with Brown because its people had a higher degree of social 
conscience. Even after the announcement of Brown II, the Times called for the adoption 
of “a plan for a rational, workable, and resonably speedy end to segregation.”19     
 Despite such sentiment, however, desegregation initially made no progress in 
Pinellas County. In 1954 and 1955, the county school board rejected applications 
submitted by Gibbs high graduates to St. Petersburg Jr. College. State NAACP officials 
encouraged the students to file suit, but they refused, claiming  to have applied “just to 
see what happened.” Instead, a group of wealthy white residents got together and paid for 
the students to attend college out of state.
20
    
 The pupil placement law bolstered the county‟s ability to circumvent integration. 
In 1955, the school board created the Committee on the Desegregation of Schools, 
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composed of 14 whites and 7 blacks. Contrary to its name, the committee merely devised 
ways of instituting the pupil placement law, and as a result, every black application to a 
white school between 1954 and 1959 was rejected.
21
 
 With control of school desegregation in the hands of individual school districts, 
and with institutions like the NAACP under fire from the Johns Committee, the Pinellas 
County‟s Board of Public Instruction also made a half-hearted effort to equalize 
educational opportunities for black students. Between 1954 and 1962 nine new black 
schools opened, while black applicants to St. Petersburg Junior College prompted the 
creation of all-black Gibbs Junior College. The state built eleven such colleges, locating 
them near white counterparts in areas where projected black enrollment exceeded 100 
students. Such developments left many black leaders conflicted. Although they grimaced 
every time a new black school opened, the reality of better supplies and facilties for black 
students was a welcome development. The push for integration, however, continued. 
When a new all-white high school, Dixie Hollins, opened in 1959, eleven black students 
applied. NAACP attorney Francisco Rodriguez sent a series of petitions to 
Superintendent Christian to admit the students. Christian, while appearing to give the 
petitions serious consideration, ultimately rejected the applications. Instead, in an effort 
to sustain the pupil placement law‟s capacity to prevent wholesale desegregation, the 
school board inititiated token integration in 1961. That summer St. Petersburg Junior 
College admitted two black students and in 1962,  St. Petersburg High School, and 
Tomlinson Vocational School admitted several black students. By the1963 100 blacks 
had transferred to previously all-white schools, and black leaders expected additional 
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desegregation the following year. But by the start of the 1964 school year, only two 
percent of the county‟s black students were attending classes with whites. Tokenism was 
still the order of the day.
22
 
*** 
 Sitting in his Boston apartment one day, Jim Sanderlin, thirty-three years old and 
fresh out of law school, had a decision to make. He had job offers from firms in Boston 
and his family was urging him to return to Washington, D.C., where he had earned his 
Bachelor‟s degree at Howard University. But Sanderlin wanted something different. 
Boston University‟s job placement services put him in contact with Fred Minnis, “a 
crafty” civil rights lawyer who had been across the country recruiting young black law 
attorneys to come to St. Petersburg. Eager to see the “the Deep South,” but “too afraid to 
go to Mississippi,” Sanderlin struck a compromise by agreeing to move to St. Ptersburg 
in 1962.
23
  
 In St. Petersburg he joined a small cadre of local of black attorneys. Sanderlin 
joined the firm of Minnis and Williams where he clerked alongside recent Howard Law 
school graduate Frank Peterman. The two cut their teeth working on the Webb‟s City 
injunction and the case of the arrested theater demonstrators, and after passing the bar in 
1963, formed their own firm with Frank White, a native of St. Petersburg and the top 
student in his graduating class at FAMU law school. With the clear expectation of 
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handling civil rights cases, the law firm of White, Peterman, and Sanderlin represented a 
changing of the guard in local legal circles.
24
  
 From the outset, Sanderlin wanted to foster the integration of Pinellas County. 
Along with White, he attended NAACP Legal Defense Fund seminars in New Orleans 
that stressed the importance of “institutional reform litigation” and outlined the proper 
procedures for handling desegregation cases. Sanderlin‟s enthusiasm encountered 
resistance on all fronts. Conservative black leaders, initially opposed to the construction 
of new schools, had come to appreciate the increased funding and expanded 
opportunities; and from years of dealing with the school board, they feared retribution. 
Moreover, Sanderlin, eventually beloved by the black community, was still a bit of a 
newcomer, and like many of the northern whites who moved to the area in the postwar 
decades, lacked a broader understanding of local conditions. Nonetheless, by 1964 most 
of Florida‟s larger urban counties already faced desegregation lawsuits, and it was time 
for Pinellas County toface the inevitable. After a family in St. Petersburg dropped a 
pending case in early 1964, Leon Bradley Sr., a police officer in Clearwater, contacted 
Frank White about suing the county school board.
25
 
 The previous year, Bradley, vice president of the Clearwater NAACP, had asked 
the board to transfer his son from the all-black Pinellas High School to John F. Kennedy 
Jr. Middle school. Bradley merely wanted to give his son an opportunity, something 
missing at the overcrowded, ill-equipped Pinellas High. Francisco Rodriguez sent 
numerous petitions to the School board on his behalf, to no avail. But Bradley refused to 
give up. After a two-hour meeting with Bradley, White concluded that the proposed 
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lawsuit would cost around $15,000, more than Bradley could afford. But it did not matter. 
This was the case White and Sanderlin had been looking for.
26
  
 In May 1964, under the auspices of the NAACP Legal Defense Fund, Jim 
Sanderlin filed suit against the Pinellas County school board. After Superintendent Floyd 
T. Christian downplayed the developments, confident in the knowledge that the school 
board had deflected the earlier lawsuit by ending “double zoneing” for elementary 
schools. Christian promised Bradley v. Board of Public Instruction of Pinellas County 
would meet a similar fate.
27
  
 He was wrong. Ruling on January 15, 1965, Federal District Judge Joseph Lieb 
called for a “comprehensive” desegregation plan that “eliminated dual attendance zones 
and reassigned pupils, faculty, and other personnel on a non-racial basis.” Two months 
later school board attorney Edward Turville and Sanderlin presented Leib with a plan to 
desegregate the entire Pinellas County school system by the 1968-1969 school year. 
Calling the plan “a realistic and fair one, considering the circumstances and conditions in 
the community, personnel and administrative problems,” Leib endorsed the proposal.28  
 The plan may have been the best available, but according to historian Gordon 
Mantler, it “contained two major flaws.” First, the “vague” definition of a “desegregated 
school” allowed school board officials to declare that a school was conforming to the 
guidelines of the plan as long as it had at least one black student. Second, the plan called 
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for the closing of black schools, setting the stage for the elimination of the institutional 
infrstructure that sustained the black community‟s economic and occupational base.29 
 The problems with the Lieb plan were evident almost immediately. In its 1967 
annual report, the school board claimed all twelve of the county‟s high schools had been 
desegregated. But these figures were misleading. At the time, Boca Ciega high school 
had only one black student and Gibbs had just one white one. Northeast High School had 
one black teacher, but no black students. Clearwater‟s Pinellas High remained an all-
black institution. School board officials, nevertheless, claimed that the desegregation 
effort was ahead of schedule.
30
 
 The closing of Gibbs Junior College (GJC) presented another dilemma. Although 
its opening in 1957 infuriated many in the black community, the school had by 1964 
become an invaluable source of upward mobility for blacks and an acceptable alternative 
to the largely white St. Petersburg Junior College. In the summer of 1965, GJC became 
part of SPJC and was renamed Skyway campus. Two years later a new SPJC campus 
opened in Clearwater and Skyway campus shut its doors for good. Blacks had continued 
to enroll at Gibbs after it became Skyway, but after it closed the number of black 
applicants to SPJC dropped off dramatically. Many black students just did not feel 
welcome in the predominantly white halls and classrooms of SPJC.
31
 
 As Sanderlin prepared motions against the school board‟s attempts to sidestep 
desegregation, another group in St. Petersburg found its voice. Twelve black officers in 
the St. Petersburg Police Department came to Sanderlin with a list of complaints, the 
most glaring of which was the department‟s discriminatory practice of assigning all of its 
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black officers to a single patrol area, known as Zone 13, which was almost exclusively 
black. Sanderlin felt they had case, but questioned whether the officers knew what they 
were getting into. “Ain‟t no turning back,” he told them, “they gone really put the heat 
one you.” The officers, later known as the “courageuos twelve,” decided to go ahead with 
the case anyway. In May 1965 Sanderlin filed suit against the city of St. Petersburg, City 
Manager Lynn Andrews, and Police Cheif Harold C. Smith, calling for a permanent 
injunction enjoining the department from continuing its discriminitory practices. 
Although the city‟s two black sergeants, Sam Jones and Hosea Rogers, were not directly 
involved, Sanderlin filed the case, Baker v. City of St. Petersburg, as a class action suit, 
incorporating the two men.
32
  
 As he would do with Sanderlin‟s motions regarding school desegregation over the 
next two years, Judge Joseph Lieb found the arguments on behalf of the plaintiff 
unconvincing. Lieb concluded that Andrews and Smith, “charged with the duty of 
operating the Police Department. . .are vested with wide discretion in matters affecting 
the management and use of their personnel.” The NAACP Legal Defense Fund, in 
addition to covering the costs, sent lawyers Jack Greenberg and Leroy D. Clark to help 
Sanderlin with an appeal. More than a year after filing an appeal with the Fifth Circuit 
Sanderlin discovered the Court had misplaced the brief, an error that caused a fifteen 
month delay in the appeal proceedings. Insisting his office had sent the court the proper 
documents, Sanderlin was perplexed. But the black leadership in St. Petersburg had a 
more pressing problem. Although the “courageous twelve” would eventually have their 
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day in court, and win, a new tobstacle had emerged, establishing a new tone in the local 
struggle for black equality.
33
    
*** 
 
 Five days after the passage of the 1965 Voting Rights Act, the Watts section of 
Los Angeles, California, exploded into race riots. For six days the Watts ghetto-home to 
nearly a quarter of a million blacks-became a war zone. Thousands of National 
Guardsmen and Las Angeles Police Department officers moved in to quell the violent 
uprising of more than 50,000 disenchanted black Americans. Thirty-four dead and $30 
million dollars in property damage later, Watts typified the growing disillusionment with 
nonviolence and the inadequacies of the movement‟s progress. Over the next three years 
race riots erupted across the country. The plight of black America-once pegged as a 
distinctly Southern phenomenon-now appeared a systemic, nationwide affliction.
34
   
 In Watts to witness the chaos was twenty-five year old Joseph A. Waller. On a 
leave of absence from his job at the St. Petersburg Times, Waller traveled to Los Angeles 
in early 1965. During and after the riot, he wrote correspondence pieces for the Times. 
With access to places and information inaccessible to white journalists, he kept the 
Sunshine City abreast of the turmoil, and for the first time in his life witnessed the “the 
power of the people.” He returned to St. Petersburg as an inspired black militant.35 
 Growing up in tight knit black neighborhood in segregated St. Petersburg, Waller 
developed an acute racial consciousness at an early age. As a kid shining shoes on 
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Central Ave, he asked his boss why the shoes of black folks were off limits. Later, after a 
series of run-ins with police officers and white authority figures, he became increasingly 
discouraged by the city‟s overt racial inequities. Fed up, he joined the Army in 1958. 
While stationed in Germany, Waller experienced a sense of freedom alien to black 
southerners. Friendships formed with blacks from other parts of the world illuminated a 
transnational struggle that transcended the informed the civil rights movement at home. 
Upon returning to the states, Waller was stationed at Fort Benning, Georgia, where his 
confident and confrontational attitude did nothing but get him into trouble. Honorably 
discharged in 1962, he made his way home to St. Petersburg, determined to get involved 
in the local struggle.
36
   
  His actual involvement came when St. Petersburg Times journalist Peggy 
Peterman introduced him to the NAACP. For a time he attended NAACP meetings and 
participated in demonstrations to desegregate the movie theaters. But it was not long 
before he concluded that the NAACP‟s efforts were “worthless” and “could not take 
them seriously.” Impatient for substantive change, he managed Frank Peterman‟s daring 
but unsuccessful campaign for a seat in the state legislature. Despite his close friendship 
with the Petermans, he never felt comfortable in their circle of middle-class activists. The 
discomfort was mutual for Peterman‟s law partner, Jim Sanderlin, who never liked 
Waller hanging around their law office. After the campaign Peterman sent Waller to 
South Carolina to work for the CORE‟s Voter Education Project (VEP). CORE attorney 
John Due put Waller in charge of voter-registration and antipoverty projects in North 
Florida. Waller, however, could not buy into the organization‟s nonviolent ethos. At a 
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rally in Gainesville, to the chagrin of VEP director Vernon Jordan, Waller advocated 
“Black Power,” a move that led to the end of his stint with the VEP. Undeterred, Waller 
formed the Florida chapter of the Student Nonviolent Coordinating Committee (SNCC).
37
 
 By 1966 the SNCC‟s message and agenda jibed well with Waller‟s sensibilities. 
Proponents of nonviolence at its inception in 1960, SNCC operatives had become 
increasingly disillusioned with the slow pace of change and the federal government‟s 
unwillingness to protect civil rights activists. Failed voter registration projects in places 
like Albany, Georgia, and the crushing denouement of the 1964 Freedom Summer 
solidified SNCC‟s militant turn. By the time “Black Power” advocate Stokely Carmichael 
became SNCC Chairman in 1966, the organization had already lost faith in nonviolence 
forms of protest.
38
  
 With a SNCC chapter up and operational and a “motivated” Waller at the helm, 
St. Petersburg‟s racial tensions heated up in the winter of 1966. The city‟s sanitation 
workers, all but one of whom were black, went on a week-long strike in November for 
better pay. Jim Sanderlin and Frank Peterman, though busy with the Baker appeal, 
represented an eight-man committee of refuse employees in labor negotiations with city 
administrators. City Manager Lynn Andrews publicly ridiculed the strikers and initially 
refused to talk. Within two days Andrews had fired 70% of the sanitation department‟s 
workforce, recruited scabs to fill the vacant positions, and ordered riot gear for police 
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officers. After several days of mounting pressure, however, Andrews capitulated and 
negotiated a settlement.
39
  
 The city‟s handling of the strike incensed Waller and his followers. SNCC, 
however, had trouble translating its frustrations into actions. Despite his criticisms of the 
NAACP, Waller initially led SNCC in a similar direction. Hoping to lure Stokely 
Carmichael for a visit, SNCC picketed an ABC liquor lounge in the black community 
that banned black patrons from entering the store and sitting at the bar. The orderly and 
uneventful picketing lasted more than a week and received little press coverage. 
Although SNCC struggled to win the support of other black leaders, Waller‟s friendship 
with Frank and Peggy Peterman kept SNCC from complete alienation. The Petermans 
could not always endorse Waller‟s radical views, but they encouraged his social activism 
and surreptitiously provided SNCC with financial support. In addition, SNCC found a 
confidante in Marvin Davies. Fired from his job as a teacher in Fort Myers because of his 
civil rights activities, Davies became a field secretary for the NAACP and opened an 
office in St. Petersburg in 1966. Initially SNCC shared space with Davies and could 
“rely” on him for material and moral support.40  
  Waller not only had trouble garnering the support of fellow movement leaders; 
he also found widespread apathy within the black community. Bit an opportunity to 
arouse the community emerged when city leaders announced their intention to spend a 
$50 million federal grant on beautifying the downtown area. Waller felt he had found an 
issue around which people could rally. Slum-like conditions pervaded the black 
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community, where many homes held tenants but had no indoor plumbing, and the dirty 
streets Waller had walked along as a kid were still unpaved and unlit at night. If SNCC 
was going to garner any support against the grant-spending, the organization needed to 
prove its legitimacy. They found their cause hanging on the wall in city hall.
41
 
 In 1945, painter George Snow Hill finished the piece, “Picnicking at Pass-a-
Grille.” Five years earlier, the St. Petersburg city council had commissioned Hill to paint 
one of his well-known “Southern Living” murals for the new city hall. For decades, 
“Picnicking at Pass-a-Grille,” depicting caricatures of black musicians with oversized 
pink lips, “elongated faces,” and grins that one critic described as looking “more like apes 
than men,” hung along the heavily trafficked first landing of the hall‟s main stairway. 
According to the St. Petersburg Times, the mural‟s “rich colors” held the “attention of 
admirers,” and “attracted interest and comment daily.”42   
 Those “admirers” were not black people. “There wasn‟t a black person I ever met 
that didn‟t despise that mural,” remembered Peggy Peterman. Beginning in the 1950s, 
city hall received complaints about the mural‟s offensiveness. Ruth MaClellan and her 
husband Charles, white social activists and members of the Council on Human Relations, 
voiced their distaste for the mural. Others, including future city councilman Ernest 
Fillyau and the Reverand Enoch Davis, lobbied city administrators to take the painting 
down. “Instead of removing the painting,” wrote Davis in his memoir, “the members of 
the council listened and laughed but did nothing about our request.”43  
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 In December, Waller sent a letter to Mayor Herman Goldner requesting that the 
city take down the “despicable” and “derogatory” mural. Goldner scoffed at the 
suggestion. “I find nothing offensive,” he explained and “must admit that I have looked at 
this mural for the past ten years with nothing but admiration.” The mayor referred the 
letter to the head of the Community Relations Commission (CRC), Chester K. Guth, who 
echoed Goldner‟s sentiments. “It is our feeling that this mural is a work of art,” retorted 
Guth in a letter to Waller. Guth compared the mural to classic “masterpieces” that would 
have long been burned “all because someone takes exception.”44 Waller tried again. In 
another letter he re-articulated his points: “It is the consensus of the black community of 
St. Petersburg that it was most unfair for the city to use taxpayer money (Negroes 
included) to inflict the pains of racism as demonstrated in the picture at city hall.” 
Unfortunately, although Waller was correct to suggest that there was widespread 
condemnation of the mural in the black community, he soon realized he did not have the 
community‟s support when it came to tactics.45  
 After reading an article published in the Evening Independent on December 23, 
describing SNCC‟s intentions of marching on city hall in protest of the mural, the Rev. 
Davis called an emergency meeting of the NAACP and CCC. Davis had concerns, 
fearing years of dedicated public service and successful social activism hung in the 
balance. With one uprising SNCC could undo decades of progress. At the meeting, 
veteran black leaders expressed their strong disapproval of SNCC‟s plans. NAACP 
president Louis O. Harper understood SNCC‟s grievances, but felt other issues were 
more important. “Picketing should be a last resort,” added one of Waller‟s former high 
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school teachers, Fannye Ayer Ponder. Chester K. Guth suggested SNCC let the CRC 
handle the situation. 
46
  
 SNCC members gathered at Webb‟s City on December 29, confident a victory 
was imminent. On Christmas Eve Waller had led a march to city hall, discouraged that it 
was closed for the holidays. They planned another trip to coincide with a city council 
meeting, realizing the city‟s major media outlets would be on hand to cover the meeting. 
Hoping to create a spectacle, the group marched two miles to city hall chanting “Lynn 
Andrews Must Go” along the way. Across the street from city hall State Attorney 
Investigator Dennis Quilligan and Justice of the Peace Richard Carr peered from their 
windows as the marchers arrived. As a crowd of mostly white onlookers formed near the 
steps of city hall, an elderly black woman began to speak. With Waller at her side, she 
launched into diatribe and in broken English lambasted local insurance companies for 
taking advantage of black clients. When laughter from the white crowd mocked the 
woman‟s garbled speech and cut her off, Waller lost his patience. Turning on his heel, the 
SNCC leader entered city hall, with Jody Wall, an eighteen-year old SNCC member 
trailing close behind. They ran up the stairs to where the mural hung and ripped it down, 
and together the two men carried the piece outside. “We‟re gonna take this picture down 
where all the black folks can see it,” Waller shouted just outside city hall. Camera crews 
followed as Waller headed for the black community.
47
   
 People were shocked. “You black bastard,” yelled a white woman as Waller left 
city hall.  Waller and Wall then paraded down the sidewalk, with SNCC members, 
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journalists, camera-crews, and other witnesses in tow. Though temporarily caught off 
guard, law enforcement officials rushed in. Detective Homer Allen, who had seen the 
march developing earlier in the day, subdued Wall with the help of Thomas Witham. 
Down the street officers apprehended SNCC activists Tommy Williams, Lemuel Green, 
John Wesley Bryant, and Crawford Jones. Before getting pinned down, Williams 
managed to distract police long enough to give Waller time to get away. Dragging the 
mural behind him as he ran westbound on Central Ave, Waller briefly evaded capture by 
throwing the mural at the feet of a pursuing officer, Lt. Adkins. Eventually Adkins 
managed to corral Waller and placed him in handcuffs and under arrest. The crumpled 
mural lay on the ground with more than a third of its paint chipped off, a symbol of 
protest march that somehow had turned into a spectacle of brazen defiance.
48
  
 At the police station, Waller, Jody Wall, Tommy Williams, and Lemuel Green 
were charged with grand larceny, resisting arrest with violence, destruction of public 
property, and unlawful assembly, affray, or riot, and held on eight thousand dollars bail. 
Crawford Jones and John Wesley Bryant recieved lesser charges and a seven thousand 
dollar bail. Several of the...refused to cooperate, including Tommy Williams who refused 
to sit on a bench with codefendants, an officer punched him in the stomach. The 
defendant‟s “cocky attitude” continued in the courtroom of Justice of Peace Richard Carr. 
“We can stand the cracker law, man- if you‟d only read it loud enough so we could hear,” 
someone shouted as the bailiff read the charges. Waller initially refused to declare 
himself indigent in order to secure a public defender, but changed his mind and informed 
the judge he would only take one “if he is not part of this racist power structure.” Carr 
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added municipal charges to the equation, increasing each of the defendants‟ bond by 
fifteen hundred dollars. Unable to afford bail, all six went to the Pinellas County jail.
49
  
 In the aftermath conservative black leaders distanced themselves from the 
incident and Waller. At an “emergency” NAACP meeting the night of the arrests, Marvin 
Davies stated the organization‟s position: “It is highly unfortunate that the despicable 
mural was removed. We feel another method could have been employed to accomplish 
similar results. As concerned leaders of the black community, we oppose any act which 
defaces public property. However, we are too, opposed to any stereotype paintings of any 
nature.”50  
 The local news media skewered Waller and his companions. In an attempt to 
undermine any public sympathy, the Evening Independent ran an interview with the 
mural‟s creator, George Snow Hill, who defended his work and claimed to be “hurt” by 
its destruction. Often an advocate of the black freedm struggle, the St. Petersburg Times, 
nonetheless condemned Waller‟s actions. “Hoodlumism is no solution to the grievances 
of the Negro minority,” read an editorial, “such actions bring nothing but injury to the 
cause of racial equality and justice.” City administrators agreed. Mayor Herman Goldner, 
echoing the sentiments of Ross Windom during the Spa Beach controversy, said “there is 
no attitude at City Hall that this was a responsible act of our Negro citizens but an 
irresponsible act of a few of our Negro community.” Framing his words to imply a sense 
of solidarity between the black and white communities, Goldner added, “I am sure that 
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the vast majority of our Negro citizenry are as ashamed of these persons who committed 
this act as we are.”51 
 The fallout was not what Joe Waller had anticipated. Hopes for a credible civil 
rights victory that might bolster SNCC‟s influence had been dashed in the span of ten 
minutes. For five of the six defendents the battle had been ended in court with either 
dismissals or probation. The legacy of Waller‟s impetuous action became his and his 
alone. Instead of creating an inspirational spectacle, Waller had become one. While 
incarcerated he did his best to prolong the public‟s attention. A hunger strike sent him to 
the jail‟s hospital ward. When the trial began on January 30, 1967, Waller fired his 
attorney and long-time confidante Frank Peterman. Feeling that the trial “had to be 
treated politically.” He asked Peterman to file a postponement, hoping CORE would send 
a lawyer to represent him. Peterman, also defending Bryant, felt a delay would harm his 
clients and ignored the request. Without a lawyer and unable to defend himself, Waller 
received a sentence of one hundred and eighty days behind bars. Returning to jail, the 
embattled SNCC leader resumed his hunger strike. During interviews with reporters he 
dismissed the judge‟s ruling as “white justice,” and added, “the whole thing was planned 
and decided before I went into court. It didn‟t make any difference what I said.”52 
 Waller‟s defiance did matter, however, to the other defendents. Careful not to 
mimic their leader‟s example, Wall, Williams, Bryant, Green, and Jones appeared 
contrite before the court. Although Municipal Judge Henry Esteva found all of them 
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guilty, he suspended their sentences. Only Waller served time for the municiple offenses. 
But the six were not out of the woods yet.
53
 
 The circuit court trials in Clearwater were fraught with complications. Presiding 
Judge Charles Phillips sympathized with the defendants and after a meeting with Waller, 
urged the city to grant parade permits to SNCC supporters. To lessen the chance of civil 
disruptions, Clearwater law enforcment officials darkened the windows of the courtroom 
and patrolled the grounds in plain clothes. But these precautions proved unnecessary as 
the threat of mass picketing never materialized.
54
  
 The number of lawyers involved in the case further complicated matters. While 
Assistant State Attorneys Richard Mensh and Allen Allweiss representd the state, the 
CORE‟s legal counsel John Due and Gainesville attorney Leslie H. Levinson handled 
Waller‟s defense. E.M. Davis repesented Jones and Williams, and public defenders 
Robert E. Jagger and Paul Barnard took the cases of Bryant, Green, and Wall. Due and 
Levinson requested a stay, arguing that trying Waller and the other defendants again for 
the same crimes constituted double jeopardy. The Florida Supreme Court disagreed and 
the trials went ahead. Despite a dizzying array of defense strategies the jury took only 
four hours to render a split verdict: Waller and Wall were guilty, and the other six were 
innocent. In July 1967, Judge Phillips rejected Waller‟s appeal for probation and 
sentenced him to six months to five years in prison. Later, after initially witholding 
adjudication, Phillips gave Wall three years probation, considering him a risk to the 
social order.
55
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 Waller later claimed, however, he “did not have to go to prison,” that an apology 
on the stand would have led to a lighter sentence. But he was unable to “walk away from 
it.” “ If one is ever convinced he is on the right side of history,” he explained, “the true 
sacrifice is doing nothing.” No one,including Judge Phillips, expected Waller to serve 
more than six months. But neither he nor anyone else understood the depths of Waller‟s 
alienation or his determination to fight for what he beleived in. Two and a half years in 
prison would both steal his spirits and fuel his rage.
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Chapter Four: The Great Refusal 
"History began to catch up with Americans," in 1968 noted historian C. Vann 
Woodward. The “fabled immunity from frustration and defeat had faltered and their 
myths of virtue and innocence became stock subject of jeers and ridicule. . ." By the late 
Sixties, “Racism and mechanization and a lagging labor movement rendered African 
Americans poor, powerless, and exploited.” The progressive accomplishments of the 
Civil Rights Movement had done little to erase the country's economic inequities. 
According to national statistics, in the mid-1960s black unemployment had reached 10% 
as compared to 5% for whites, and blacks earned on average 45% less than whites. 
Moreover, the increasing militancy of the antiwar movement and the ascendency of 
“Black Power” to the fore of the civil rights struggle alienated many of the white liberals 
who once-supported both causes. The social welfare programs of Johnson‟s Great Society 
fell out of favor with Americans both disillusioned by the war in Vietnam and tired of 
rampant racial violence. The assassination of Dr. Martin Luther King Jr. in May marked 
the twilight of the classical Civil Rights Movement and along with the murder of 
presidential candidate Robert Kennedy, compounded the nation‟s sense of urgency and 
moral declension. America's opportunity to redress centuries of injustice eventually 
dissolved in a wave of reactionary politics. History had begun to “catch up with 
Americans” indeed.1  
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University of Tennessee Press, 1997), 152, 159; and James Sullivan, “The Florida Teacher Walkout in the 
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In St. Petersburg, the racial tensions between the white and black communities 
had only intensified since the mural incident. The efforts of local organizations like the 
NAACP to procure better job opportunities for blacks had made little progress. By the 
beginning of 1968, fifty-nine percent of the city‟s black population earned less than $100 
a week. And nowhere did the city‟s economic and racial inequalities intersect more so 
than within the ranks of the sanitation department. As the eyes of the nation turned to 
Memphis, Tennessee, where Martin Luther King Jr. had been assassinated while in town 
assisting black sanitation workers in a citywide strike, long standing tensions within St. 
Petersburg‟s own department bubbled to the surface. While community leaders like Ike 
Williams and Chester K. Guth warned the atmosphere in St. Petersburg had the 
“ingredients of a riot,” others downplayed the building tensions. But a month after King‟s 
death, the spirit of Memphis touched St. Petersburg.
2
     
On May 6, 1968, a number of the city‟s sanitation employees went on strike. At 8 
a.m. that morning, after receiving word of the stoppage, City Manager Andrews arrived 
at the sanitation department's Lake Maggiore compound where he found plenty of 
sanitation workers, but few willing to work. Andrews listened as the milling workers 
announced their grievances, including the lack of pay raises for collectors and foremen. 
The men expressed their frustrations for what they considered to be broken promises. A 
month earlier the city had restructured the hours and pay scales for the sanitation 
department. Instead of paying $101.40 for six days of work including time and a half on 
Saturdays, the new system paid $73.00 for five days of work. Sanitation Director Walter 
Schultz initially gained employee support for the plan by promising a month-long trial 
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period, after which the accounting books would be opened and some of the savings 
shared with the workers. But a month later, support began to dwindle as the books 
remained closed. The city asked for a two-week extension. After two weeks, another 
extension. By then the sanitation employees had had enough and responded with a strike. 
Andrews recommended the men take the day off, return to work the next morning, and 
give the city time to consider their demands.
3
 
Later, at an emergency city council meeting, Andrew‟s labeled the situation a 
“wild cat” strike, the product of a “few dissident workers,” and dismissed their demand 
for a 25-cents an hour raise. Andrews had seen this before. To avert a strike in 1964, he 
granted the requested raises. In 1966, again unhappy with their pay, refuse workers 
walked off the job. Taking a tougher stance, Andrews hired “scabs” from out of town as 
temporary replacements. But after a week, he gave in. This time, however, having wilted 
under pressure twice already, Andrews was “not going to be intimidated.”4  
The sanitation workers, too, had learned from the past. During the 1966 work 
stoppage, when an editorial in the St. Petersburg Times said the strikers were not worthy 
of raise because they were illiterate, sanitation crew chief Joe Savage formed the Young 
Men‟s Progressive Club (YMPC). The organization, comprised of Savage‟s coworkers, 
hired Times reporter Sam Adams to teach them to read and write. In addition, the YMPC 
enlisted Jim Sanderlin and Frank Peterman to speak on their behalf in monthly meetings 
with department heads. Over the next two years many of the city‟s refuse workers 
prepared for the possibility of another standoff.
5
      
                                               
3 St. Petersburg Times, May 7, 1968. 
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On Tuesday May 7, the second day of the strike, Andrews fired fifty-two 
sanitation workers when they refused to go to work. For another two days (the sanitation 
department usually took Wednesdays off) garbage went uncollected as the strikers sat 
idle in solidarity. Several of the workers reportedly wanted no part in the strike, but 
feared violent repercussions from coworkers if they refused to participate. Others 
remained on the job, and later, many suffered the consequences. While negotiations 
between Andrews and strike leaders continued, Savage urged his men to return to work.
6
   
 At the advice of their leaders, 150 refuse workers showed up at the sanitation 
compound Thursday morning. Only 40 were there to work. The others had come to 
protest. Around 7:10 a.m. a garbage truck escorted by police cruisers tried to leave the 
premises. With Sanderlin and Savage looking on, protestors formed a barrier to block the 
exit. After Police Sgt. Ray Stewart warned them to back off, Sanderlin interceded and 
convinced them to move, allowing two garbage trucks to leave the premises. Moments 
later, as a third struck sped away, confusion ensued when thirty-five sanitation workers, 
at the sight of police, broke ranks and abandoned the strike. Squad cars pulled into the 
compound and officers clad in riot gear piled out. After ensuring the safe passage of a 
fourth and final truck, the riot-squad hung around for half an hour before leaving. The 
protestors also disbanded and headed home, ready to fight another day.  (footnote: During 
the 1966 strike the city had purchased $35,000 in riot equipment but had never used it 
until now.) The four sanitation trucks collected refuse from hospitals, schools, and 
businesses, but residential trash piled up for the fourth consecutive day.
7
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In light of the incident, Andrews took firm control of the situation. After firing the 
120 absentees, he threw out the "new system," a major impetus for the strike, and 
reverted to the old system with a 5-cents an hour raise.  To drive his point home and 
show he was serious, Andrews provided temporary relief from the lack of trash collection 
by establishing several cities where citizens could dump their own refuse. After two days, 
over 12,000 vehicles had dumped trash at one of the eleven designated locations. 
Responding to complaints from other departments about the unfairness of a special raise 
for the sanitation workers, Andrews hoped to defuse the situation. He announced a five-
cents an hour pay raise for the city‟s 958 hourly employees. Sanderlin and Savage met 
with Andrews and reduced their demand to a twenty-cents an hour increase. Andrews 
countered with his final offer, 7-cents more an hour. Talks stalled.
8
  
Speaking that night at Bethel Community Baptist Church, Ike Williams, then 
president of the St. Petersburg chapter of the NAACP, proposed an impromptu march to 
city hall, where Sanderlin busily negotiated with city leaders. Singing refrains of "We 
Shall Overcome," sixty people headed downtown. The councilmen were, however, 
unmoved by the display, and in reaffirming their support for Andrews, rejected 
Sanderlin‟s demands.9 
Days of fruitless negotiations turned into weeks. Over time, as the sanitation 
department slowly filled its vacancies with scabs and the occasional defeated striker, and 
every day more garbage trucks took to the streets, Andrew‟s position strengthened. 
"There will be no more effort to meet with these people, period,” he declared, “they are 
no longer city employees." Within two weeks, Schultz reported garbage collection was 
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back to "100%.” In truth, refuse collection had been limited to white neighborhoods, 
completely neglecting the black parts of town. The department finally addressed the trash 
buildup in the black community, sending garbage trucks manned by inmates from the city 
jail, accompanied by police cruisers, to pick up the refuse. Unimpressed, Savage led 
reporters through alleys in other black neighborhoods where rotting trash was piled high 
and overflowing into the right of way. But with an ever-improving sanitation department 
up and running, and the support of much of the city council and chamber of commerce, 
Andrews had little reason to back down.
10
  
Pressuring the chamber of commerce to rescind its support for Andrews, the 
NAACP revived the “selective buying” spirit of 1960, calling for an economic boycott of 
white-owned business on May 23. According to Williams, the proposal "was partially in 
sympathy with the 211 striking garbagemen and partially to protest the discriminatory 
hiring practices by city hall and the general racist attitude of downtown merchants and 
professional businessmen." The NAACP saw the inchoate controversy as the perfect 
opportunity to redress a variety of systemic problems facing the black community.
11
   
The strikers got another, unexpected, boost when Mayor Don Jones, broke ranks 
with his fellow councilman. Angered by the city's "poor judgment," Jones charged the 
city with “sowing the seeds of the present garbage crisis." A transplant from Geneva, 
New York, and former insurance salesman, Jones had been on the city council since 1963 
when his friend, Mayor Herman Goldner, convinced him to get into politics. "I don't 
think city council or the administration have fulfilled their responsibility or shown a 
sensitivity to the community," he explained, "and these garbage men are now the focal 
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point of that failure." During the weeklong strike in 1966, Jones had urged Andrews to 
use restraint and encouraged him to negotiate a settlement. While Jones was only one 
man with one vote on a council of nine, his defection provided the strikers much needed 
moral support, even if it cost him his political career. For more than three months Jones 
was the only major city official to publicly endorse the striker‟s cause.12  
Despite the verbal sparring between Jones and his contemporaries and the stepped 
up efforts of the NAACP, nothing substantial emerged to pressure Andrews or the city 
council. As May faded into June, negotiations stagnated. Andrews refused to open talks 
with the "fired" men, and newspaper editorials revealed a torn public. Many residents 
disagreed with Andrews's handling of the situation and vented disdain for city 
administrators. Others expressed confusion and bewilderment. Blinded by beautiful 
sunsets and myths of social harmony, much of St. Petersburg's white population failed to 
discern the growing racial tension within the black community. Ignoring the lessons of 
the Memphis strike, convinced that similar events "could not happen here," the city 
council, led by an authoritarian city manager, simply dug in its heels and refused to 
negotiate.
13
  
The symptoms, however, of building social turmoil, were in plain sight. On June 
5, the St. Petersburg Times published an assessment of the damage. Since May 9, the 
report read, "Twenty fires had been deliberately set causing an estimated damage of 
$300,000." Firebombs burned a lumberyard, destroyed automobiles, and set a house 
ablaze. The St. Petersburg fire department responded to eight fires within a 12-hour 
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period on June 4 alone. During the first few evenings of the strike, firebombs struck the 
homes of two non-striking sanitation employees. Savage expressed doubt that sanitation 
workers were responsible for the bombings, but confessed he "really couldn't be sure." To 
distance themselves from the incendiary acts, Sanderlin and Savage formed an Anti-
Violence Committee. Both the city council and the Anti-Violence Committee offered 
rewards for information leading to the arrests of those involved in the firebombings. But 
the random acts continued. Weeks later, gun shots, firebombs, bricks, and glass bottles-
again targeting sanitation workers not participating in the strike-shattered windows and 
ignited fires. Such disturbances continued sporadically in the oncoming weeks, keeping 
police officers, already working twelve-hour shifts, many without a day off, fatigued and 
on constant call.
14
   
 With few other options, the idle sanitation workers took their case to the streets in 
a series of marches, hoping to mobilize an apathetic public around their cause. Aside 
from the spontaneous march nearly three weeks earlier, the struggle had remained 
isolated in the black community, behind the insulated walls of black churches and the 
closed doors of city hall. The first of more than 40 marches took place on Friday, June 7. 
Three hundred citizens-black and white-marched the 29 blocks from Jordan Park 
community center to city hall. Initially slated as a protest march, the event also became a 
tribute to the recently assassinated presidential candidate Robert Kennedy. Just as the 
striking sanitation workers tried to counter the recent violent episodes with a peaceful 
march, Joe Waller and a band of followers joined the march. Waller had recently returned 
from Gainesville, Florida, where his odyssey of imprisonment had taken another turn. In 
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May, ACLU attorney Gardner Becket joined his defense team and convinced the Second 
District Court of Appeals to release Waller on parole while awaiting an appellate ruling. 
Upon his release, Waller headed north to Gainesville to protest the incarceration of SCLC 
member Irvin Lee Dawkins. Within hours of arriving, Waller was back in jail, arrested on 
charges of “attempting to incite a riot.” He posted bail, but was back behind bars the 
same day. The state attorney, after receiving word of the outbreak of the sanitation strike 
and worried Waller would get into even more trouble, had his bond revoked. For two 
more weeks Waller sat in an Alachua County jail cell. Finally released on May 29, he 
fled Gainesville on the floorboard of a friend‟s car and headed home to St. Petersburg. 
When he arrived, Waller was dismayed with the handling of the strike, and what he saw 
as “nice cozy relationship” between the embattled factions.  As he and his followers 
joined the back of the procession, they injected it with an air of militancy, chanting 
“We're gonna let St. Petersburg burn down, burn, burn, down, burn burn. . .” Savage 
abandoned the head of the march and rushed to quiet the provocateurs. After another 
verse, Waller silenced the group, only to continue the refrain a few minutes later.
15
 
The return of Joe Waller to St. Petersburg worried conservative leaders on both 
sides of the issue. The St. Petersburg Times and Evening Independent printed a series of 
profiles about Waller, hoping to delegitimize him. But this was no longer 1966 and to 
impressionable youths, Waller‟s rhetoric was just what they were looking for. Instead of 
discrediting the militant, the media attention raised his popularity and increased his 
following. Waller formed a black separatist organization known as the Junta of Militant 
Organization (JOMO). If the conservative strike leaders, in the words of Waller, were 
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people “in the image of the oppressor,” JOMO represented an alternative path that 
especially appealed to the younger generation. Yet even Sanderlin and Ike Williams felt 
Waller‟s magnetism and increasingly sympathized with his cause."It is time this 
community rose up in arms," intoned I.W. Williams before a crowd of over 200 gathered 
at Galilee Missionary Baptist Church. Williams assailed Andrews's "lack of human 
dignity," calling him a "zero in race relations and faithfulness to city employees." Marvin 
Davies followed Williams at the podium with a heartfelt plea for community unification, 
and encouraged a more concerted effort in the economic boycott of downtown merchants. 
“Merchants who support Lynn Andrews shouldn‟t have your dollar,” he implored. That 
same night, speaking in front of a group of St. Petersburg Jr. College students, Sanderlin 
articulated the fragility of the situation:"The strike provides a check on violence because 
Negroes were afraid violence might hurt the strikers' position. But the longer the strike 
goes without a solution the more impatient and disposed toward violence Negroes will 
become."
16
 
 Other factors played a role in the shifting tone of the strike. Most significantly 
was the economic toll taken on its participants. Already underpaid, the financial burdens 
of continuing the fight mounted. Over 200 men with families, which included more than 
100 children, faced another month with little or no income. To alleviate some of the 
pressure, the Presbyterian Commission on Race and Religion provided the strikers with a 
$1,400 preliminary grant. Sanderlin called it “seed money,” and said the Commission 
promised even more to help cover the $700 a week budget of the recently formed 
Garbagemen‟s Welfare Fund. In addition, the Society of Friends chipped in $225 
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collected from the church‟s membership. As many of the idle worker‟s wives found 
second jobs, and sanitation supervisor Bill Pulske announced the department was now 
“more than filled,” any financial assistance helped. June sped towards July without an 
end in sight.
17
  
 The striking sanitation workers lacked a similar bravado. With no end in sight, 
strike leaders appealed to outsiders for help...To gain the support of national civil rights 
leaders and garner widespread attention, ex-sanitation workers Henry Cathirell and 
Howard Myrick flew to Washington D.C. on June 19 to meet with SCLC Chairman Dr. 
Ralph D. Abernathy, who was busy leading the Poor People‟s March on Washington. 
“Stand fast and know we‟re with you,” a visibly exhausted and emotionally drained 
Abernathy advised, and “we will do everything we can to help toward a solution of the 
problem.” Abernathy‟s aide Rev. Albert Sampson implored Cathirell and Myrick to 
involve white members of the community in their struggle: “Get the people to understand 
that it is not just the black community that is suffering but the entire community. Get 
nuns, church people, ministers of the city, and get the liberals involved and you‟ll win.”18  
 While the men were in Washington, such efforts had already begun at home. An 
ecumenical group of religious leaders, calling themselves the Concerned Clergy of the St. 
Petersburg Area, met with the city council and voiced deep concerns about the growing 
crisis. The city responded with a symbolic, yet nonetheless empty gesture. Following the 
orders of Vice Mayor Horace Williams, the city‟s legal team deleted the last remaining 
references to racial segregation in the city charter, of which sections still enabled the city 
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council “to establish and set apart separate residential limits or districts for white and 
Negro residents.” The city charter contained a provision-long declared unconstitutional-
that enforced an all-white primary in local elections. The move to expurgate racism from 
the charter, while hyped as a progressive move, made little substantive difference. 
Battling rain and oppressive heat, the marching continued.
19
 
 Efforts to gain national attention paid off, but at the expense of splintering the 
grassroots resistance. As a cast of nationally prominent civil rights leaders descended 
upon St. Petersburg, local support waned. The crises outgrew its localized scope, and in 
turn, became less about the sanitation workers and the racial and economic injustices in 
St. Petersburg and more about demonizing white reactionaries like Lynn Andrews. The 
appearance national figures, however, only strengthened Andrews‟ resolve. In 
preparation for the arrival of A.D. King, brother of the slain Martin Luther King Jr., 
Andrews, for the first time since the marches began, denied the strikers a permit. He 
claimed the timing, which had been set back later than usual, would interfere with traffic. 
Several city council members disagreed with the decision, concerned it would only 
antagonize the resistance. Andrews relented, but issued the permit on the grounds that the 
march used an alternative route. Outraged, yet undeterred, Savage planned to go ahead 
with the march.  Andrews warned the strikers against defying the permit, and threatened 
to use law enforcement officials to break up the march. King, upon learning of the 
contentious developments, backed out. More than 250 people, using the old route, 
marched anyway. As promised, police met the procession head on.
20
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 Equipped with shotguns, gas masks, and shields, 160 officers-many of them 
brought in from Clearwater- formed a barricade several blocks from city hall to intercept 
the marchers. For thirty minutes demonstrators calmly confronted police. Some sat down 
and sang freedom songs. Police ordered everyone to disband, but they were ignored. 
Officers repeatedly ordered the crowd to disperse, but no one budged. After about twenty 
minutes, King and Sanderlin drove by in a convertible, and the throng of demonstrators 
surged towards the vehicle. Set off by the commotion, officers moved in on the crowd 
and calmly began making arrests. The episode, with all the ingredients for a violent 
confrontation, remained peaceful even as police hauled forty-three protestors off to jail.
21
 
 As local groups like the Concerned Clergy continued to call for open 
communications, more outsiders poured in.  Kentucky state senator Georgia Davis and 
Kentucky Christian Leadership Conference (KCLC) representative Raoul Cunningham 
landed in St. Petersburg on July 3. Surveying the situation, Davis, Kentucky‟s first black 
senator, expressed “despondency” over the “lack of Negro support,” in a stump speech in 
front of city hall. Two hundred and thirty people answered the call, and showed up to 
march on Independence Day. And Davis did not stop there. The next morning she led a 
“pray in” outside the entrance to the sanitation department. Beginning about 6 a.m., an 
interracial group of women stood in front of the compound singing and praying. For 
several days the pray-ins continued before Davis left for Kentucky. 
22
   
 Outsiders kept coming. On the heels of Davis and Cunningham‟s departure, 
William Lamd, a staff member of the New York-based Commission on Racial Justice of 
the United Church of Christ. Lamd took up residence in the YMPC‟s new headquarters, a 
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two-story wooden house on Dixie Ave. Two weeks later, on June 12, A.D. King returned 
with an entourage, including SCLC vice president C.K. Steele, Senator Davis, Raul 
Cunningham, and several union officials from around the state. That evening, King gave 
an impassioned speech to a gathering at Mt. Zion Primitive Baptist Church. His abstract 
rhetoric touched on the impoverished state of the nation and the “many problems in St. 
Petersburg.” “America is flowing with milk and honey,” he exclaimed. “I‟m talking 
about white America. I want some of that milk and honey.” But he offered little in the 
way of concrete solutions. Marvin Davies followed King at the lectern and presented the 
ex-sanitation employees with a $500 check from the American Federation of State, 
County, and Municipal Employees Union, with promises of more donations down the 
road. “We‟re going to let everybody know the struggle is going to continue in St. 
Petersburg,” Davis said. The more intense the local situation became, the less likely a 
strike settlement seemed. Nonetheless, amid oppressive heat and torrential summer rains 
the stalwart strikers sloshed their way to city hall almost every day of July.
23
 
  The protracted struggle began to take its toll on all sides of the issue. The 
national attention not only worried city officials and attenuated public support, it irked 
local black leadership as well. On July 12, the St. Petersburg branch of the NAACP 
officially withdrew its support of the sanitation strike. “At this time we don‟t have any 
responsibilities for decisions and strategies of the sanitation workers,” declared President 
Ike Williams. The NAACP had “served as a catalyst for getting negotiations started,” 
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Williams added, and “members of the organization will continue to participate in the 
marches, but only as individuals.”24 
 Local police officers, too, had grown tired of the situation. By late June the city 
had spent more than $60,000 in police overtime. That number only increased as more 
officers were needed to oversee the daily marches and handle the growing social discord. 
Although cruisers had stopped escorting garbage trucks on their runs, everyday another 
incident demanded their attention: structure fires; vandalism; and the ever present threat 
of JOMO. On July 8, police arrested six JOMO forces for picketing outside Webb‟s City 
and shouting “Let‟s burn it down.” As the pressure mounted, and communication 
channels closed, no one seemed to benefit from ongoing crisis.
25
   
 The efforts of outside agitators climaxed on the final evening in July. Nearly 
1,100 people crammed into the gymnasium at Gibbs high school to hear Rev. Ralph 
Abernathy and A.D. King speak. As the event began, Joe Waller, who had been 
purposefully excluded from the program, entered the gym through a side door. When he 
appeared, the place erupted with applause. Waller gave an impromptu speech where he 
worked the crowd into a frenzy, declaring “anyone who would starve 211 families is 
criminal.” Abernathy and King followed, and the climate inside the gym cooled down. 
Between inspirational orations, the coterie joined together in freedom songs; choruses of 
"We Shall Overcome" reverberated throughout the emotionally charged evening. As the 
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event came to a close, hundreds of people lined up to donate money to the depleted 
sanitation fund.
26
  
 Playing off the momentum, strike leaders planned the “National Mobilization 
Day” march, expecting more than a thousand participants from around the state. CORE 
representative Patricia Stephens Due, arrested weeks earlier outside the sanitation 
compound along with several other protesters for laying down in front of the exit, 
preventing the trucks from leaving, brought in dozens of supporters from Tallahassee. 
Despite such efforts, only 650 people showed up.  Using an alternative route for the first 
time, marchers locked arms and paraded east on Central Ave, while police officers 
blocked oncoming traffic.  Wearing a beard and darkly tinted sunglasses, Waller took 
over when the march reached city hall. "We keep talking about fighting for freedom in 
Vietnam when the real battleground is in the streets of this country,” he shouted. “ I can 
hardly pronounce Ho Chi Minh, but I can pronounce George Wallace. I can pronounce 
Ku Klux Klan. I can pronounce Lynn Andrews." But like so many times in the past, the 
thundering rhetoric, and the heartfelt pleas, failed to make a difference.
27
  
 The “NMD” march marked the end of the line for the striking sanitation workers. 
Their cause had no staying power with a national audience overwhelmed by seemingly 
ubiquitous social strife. Local support flagged, too. Days later, JOMO renounced its 
support. Waller had tried on many occasions to take over as the voice of the sanitation 
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workers, arguing he “could have ended the situation a long time ago,” but their futile 
forms of protest had run their course with the militant leader.
28
    
 Just as the strike reached its nadir, cracks in Andrew‟s hegemony began to form, 
letting in a ray of hope for the sanitation workers. The city manager had become sick 
with power and desperate to bury the opposition. The attempt to deny the strikers a 
permit had mushroomed into an all out effort by Andrews to reject all future permit 
requests. Moreover, he had submitted the names of a number of outsiders assisting with 
the strike to congressman William Cramer. If a riot should occur, reasoned Andrews, the 
people on his list could be subject to prosecution under a new federal antiriot act. City 
Councilmen Claude Greene implied Andrews intended on instigating such trouble. “How 
many people do you plan to kill during this controlled riot,” he asked. The dissension 
stretched beyond city hall. To help repair the communication gap, members of the 
chamber of commerce, along with Mayor Jones, initiated the creation of the Community 
Alliance, a biracial organization “designed to solve problems” of poor job opportunities 
for local blacks, the renovation of slum housing, and the expansion and improvement of 
educational opportunities. Unlike in years past, economic motives had come into play too 
late.
29
  
 By mid-August, St. Petersburg had, according to one reporter, “Out Memphised 
Memphis." Despite the criticism, Andrews seemed confident as ever. "The strike ended 
May 20, and the sanitation department has been rebuilt with new employees," he 
reiterated time and again. Sanderlin, recognizing what Waller had discerned all along, the 
futility of nonviolent demonstrations, put a halt to the meetings. A few days later, when 
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riot police wielding bayoneted rifles arrested picketers in front of the houses of both Lynn 
Andrews and Claude Greene, the nonviolent struggle was all but over. In a rare 
appearance before the city council, Sanderlin, Enoch Davis, and several representatives 
from the black community, made a final plea on behalf of the fired sanitation workers. 
“No responsible city can allow 221 men to be fired without publicly inquiry, without a 
public responsibility shown in it,” said Sanderlin.  Davis warned “if the crisis goes 
unsettled,” the more than 5,000 members of the seven local black churches would take to 
the streets in protest. Barbara Robinson, a spokesperson for the Young Women‟s 
Progressive Willing Workers Club, declared: “The black community is becoming more 
enraged,” and urged a settlement “before it leads to destruction and loss of life.” The 
wave of sympathy felt earlier by councilmen like Claude Greene, crashed when picketers 
targeted his home, an again Jones stood alone in favor of negotiating a settlement. No one 
had to wait long to realize the severity of the fomenting crisis. 
30
  
 The arrest and beating of Joe Waller sent members of the black community over 
the edge.  In an apparent setup, police took Waller into custody after he showed up to 
quell a confrontation between a young black woman and the officers. On the way to the 
station police bruised and bloodied a handcuffed Waller. “They took it all out on me,” he 
said, “all of their frustration.” The officers took Waller to the hospital and when pictures 
of his injuries circulated throughout black neighborhoods, the rebellion began.
31
  
In the early morning hours of Saturday, August 17, the city erupted into race riots. 
Fires raged throughout the night, destroying, warehouses, abandoned homes, and parked 
                                                                                                                                                       
29 St. Petersburg Times, July 14, 1968, July 23, 1968; David Welch, interview by Samuel Davis, July 30, 
1998; Author‟s interview with Don Jones, August 20, 2008. 
30 St. Petersburg Times, August 16, 1968. 
31 Author‟s interview with Omali Yeshitela, June 23, 2009. 
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cars. As rocks pelted police cruisers and smashed storefront windows, an armored vehicle 
dubbed “The Monster” moved throughout the city, spraying tear gas canisters into 
crowds of congregated suspects. The city council called a meeting that morning and 
granted Andrews expanded authority over city affairs. Andrews declared a “civil 
emergency” and shut down a 550-block area within the black community. Moreover, 
Andrews banned the sale of liquor and “containerized” gasoline. That afternoon 
Governor Claude Kirk made a brief stop in St. Petersburg to meet with city 
administrators. Kirk committed 350 National Guardsmen, highway patrolmen, and game 
wardens, all with special riot training, to assist in restoring order if needed. The 
disturbances abated Saturday afternoon, an eerie calm before the oncoming storm. The 
city braced itself for nightfall.
32
 
 As anticipated, the rioting resumed Saturday evening and stretched into Sunday. 
Again police brought out the “The Monster” to quell the violence. When the sun rose 
Sunday morning, the damage report told the story: Fifty-nine arrests, eleven fires, and 
more than $120,000 dollars in property destruction. An opinion poll printed in the St. 
Petersburg Times that Sunday revealed for the first time the disparate perspectives 
running along racial lines. 58% of whites considered the problem "very serious" as 
opposed to 94% of non-whites. 76% of whites felt the demonstrations and marches 
should stop, but only 35% of non-whites held this opinion. Interestingly, 61% of whites, 
compared to 23% of non-whites, believed "outsiders" to be responsible for the 
demonstrations.
33
 
                                               
32 St. Petersburg Times, August 18, 1968. 
33Ibid., August 18, 1968. 
 86 
 
   For the third consecutive night, violence consumed St. Petersburg. The 
"monster" once again roamed the streets unleashing torrents of tear gas. At one point, in a 
bout with friendly fire, policemen driving the armored vehicle spilled out into the streets 
after inhaling the noxious gas. Later, a tear gas canister crashed through the window of 
St. Petersburg resident Charles P. Kelly‟s, barely missing his eleven-year-old daughter. 
As smoke filled the house, Kelly and his family stood in their front yard for over 12 hours 
waiting for the air to clear. Scattered disruptions occurred again Monday night, but with 
less intensity. Andrews perceived an "easing of tension in the Negro community," but  
kept bars and liquor stores in the black sections of town  closed for another night.  
Ironically, current sanitation employees went to work Tuesday morning cleaning the 
destruction wrought by the violence.
34
  
  The rioting made a strong case for the futility of nonviolent forms of protest. 
Although hardly anything on the scale of Watts or Detroit, the unprecedented violence 
sent all sides scrambling into action. In the end, economics won the day. The city had 
spent nearly half a million dollars on extra police and riot gear while experiencing a 5 
percent decline in the tourist trade. The Community Alliance, excluding Sanderlin and 
Savage, stepped in and negotiated a settlement. On August 30, the sanitation strike 
officially ended. In a press conference, Andrews sat beside black accountant David 
Welch, cochairman of the Community Alliance, and announced the terms of the 
settlement. Conspicuously absent from the proceedings were the leaders of the entire 
sanitation strike, Jim Sanderlin and Joseph Savage. Sanderlin, who had been told the 
settlement announcement would come quietly and without a press conference, later 
                                               
34 St. Petersburg Times, August 19, 1968. 
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admitted he felt the Community Alliance had sold the strikers out at the expense of an 
immediate compromise with city officials. Nevertheless, no one complained that the 
crisis had finally ended.
35
   
 Eventually 83 of the 211 strikers went back to work under the original pay scale, 
the one previously abandoned by Schultz for streamlining purposes. Those who did not 
go back to work found other jobs. By October 1, the beginning of the city's fiscal year, 
collectors received an increase of 8-cents an hour. Foremen earned an additional 14-cents 
an hour raise. Veterans lost their seniority and accumulated sick leave, but according to 
David Welch, eventually regained the lost benefits. But ultimately the strike succeeded 
because of what it meant for the future of community relations, not necessarily for any 
tangible gains won by individual sanitation workers.
36
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                               
35 St. Petersburg Times, August 31, 1968; Mantler, “I‟m Against the Way It is Being Done,” 97. 
36 Davis‟s interview with David Welch, July 30, 1998. 
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Chapter Five: Epilogue  
 The sanitation strike represented a watershed moment in the history of St. 
Petersburg. The depth of the city‟s racial and economic injustices had been exposed and 
no longer could city leaders ignore or claim to be unaware of existing racial problems. 
Moreover, the creation of the Community Alliance represented the first time in the city‟s 
history that a cross-section of community leaders--white and black--had come together to 
address the plight of the oppressed. It looked as if, in the words of Mayor Don Jones, St. 
Petersburg had finally “joined the 20th century.”1  
 Indeed, maybe it had. Just eight months after the sanitation strike ended, C. Bette 
Wimbish broke the color line in local politics, winning a seat on the city council in March 
1969. Just four years earlier, she had enrolled at Florida A&M University‟s law school 
with ambitious plans to become an attorney. Just shy of her graduation in 1967, her 
husband, Ralph Wimbish unexpectedly passed away. Never one to quail in the face of 
adversity, C. Bette returned to St. Petersburg to finish what she and her husband had 
started.
2
 
 Jim Sanderlin, too, rode the wave of his successful social activism into uncharted 
waters. In 1972, he became Pinellas County‟s first black judge. Three years later, he won 
election to the county circuit court. But the ascents of Wimbish and Sanderlin also 
represented a racial and cultural convergence many in the black community hoped to 
avoid. Blacks worried about the ramifications of integration; about the loss of 
                                               
1 Author‟s interview with Don Jones, August 20, 2008.  
2 St. Petersburg Times, March 2, 1969; Babb, “We Took the Leadership,” 301. 
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community; the loss of identity. And when the schools began to desegregate, those fears 
intensified.
3
  
 When it came to education, especially in the late-1960s, blacks in St. Petersburg 
cared more about equal opportunities and less about integration. The NAACP, however, 
reasoned that unitary status equality would never occur if the school system remained 
segregated. Until white students went to schools in the black community, their parents 
would have little incentives to care about the conditions of those schools.
4
   
 With that as his driving philosophy, Jim Sanderlin continued the fight for school 
desegregation. In 1968, the Fifth Circuit of Appeals ruled that Florida, along with six 
other states, must integrate its remaining all black schools or shut them down. A year 
later, the Supreme Court threw out Brown II’s implementation timetable of “with all 
deliberate speed,” and ordered “every school district” to “terminate dual school systems 
at once and to operate. . . only unitary schools” (Alexander v. Holmes County Board of 
Education). But in St. Petersburg, like much of the entire county, demographic patterns 
adversely affected the progress of desegregation. In 1970, Judge Leib signed off on 
another desegregation plan that instituted “pairing” and “clustering,” and called for the 
closing of Gibbs High School. This decision almost devastated the black community and 
intensified its worst fears about integration. However, on August 12, 1970, after more 
than two thousand black citizens signed a petition to keep Gibbs open, the school board 
capitulated.
5
  
                                               
3 Goodden, “James B. Sanderlin,” 83, 86. 
4 C. Bette Wimbish, interview by Tonya Simmons, November 25, 1993; Mantler, “I‟m Against the Way It 
is Being Done,” 116.  
5 Ibid., 117. 
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 Victory came at a cost. Although Gibbs remained open, it began the 1970-71 
school year with a white principal and newly installed racial quotas. Whites made up 
70% of the student body, and blacks the other 30 percent. Gibbs may have been saved, 
but it certainly was no longer the school 2,000 petitioners had hoped to save. 
Unfortunately, the toughest part of integration for the black community had yet to come. 
That same year, the Supreme Court approved the use of busing to achieve school 
desegregation in Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenberg Board of Education. By the beginning 
of the 1971-72 academic year, upon the orders of Judge Lieb, the school board 
implemented a comprehensive busing plan. Attendance zones separated north and south 
county schools in an attempt to scatter black students proportionately throughout Pinellas 
while requiring selective white communities to accept terms that sent their children to 
schools in black neighborhoods for two years. While much of the bad press that busing 
received came from white parents unhappy with rezoning, black children within a few 
blocks radius of one another might attend four different schools. They therefore, bore the 
brunt of the burden.
6
 
 One individual particularly incensed by the dismantling of the black community 
was Joe Waller. For three years following the sanitation strike, while his lawyers 
appealed his sentences from the mural incident and his arrest in August 1968, Waller was 
in an out of prison. His personal struggle came to symbolize that of St. Petersburg‟s black 
community in the early years of integration: social and cultural alienation and loss of 
identity. In 1972, he formed the African People‟s Socialist Party (APSP), and changed his 
name to Omali Yeshitela, which in Swahili, means “an umbrella to protect one thousand 
people.” The APSP, also known as the UHURUs, pioneered a Pan-Africanist approach to 
                                               
6 Ibid., 118-120. 
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social struggle in St. Petersburg, and while many of the city‟s most prominent figures 
from the civil rights era embraced the newfound freedoms, Waller never spiritually left 
the insular world he came from. Unlike so many others, Waller never let go of the cloudy 
legacies that cast a long shadow on the Sunshine City.   
 
 
 
  
 
 92 
 
Bibliography 
 
Newspapers 
 
Evening Independent 
New York Times 
St. Petersburg Times 
Tampa Tribune 
Miami News 
 
Books, Chapters 
 
Applebome, Peter, Dixie Rising: How the South is Shaping American Values, Politics, 
and Culture. New York: Harcourt Brace and Company, 1996.  
 
Arsenault, Raymond, Freedom Riders: 1961 and the Struggle for Racial Justice. New 
York: Oxford University Press, 2006. 
 
_____, St. Petersburg and the Florida Dream, 1880-1950. Gainesville: University Press 
of Florida, 1996. 
 
Baker, Rick, Mangroves to Major League: A Timeline of St. Petersburg, Florida 
(Prehistory to 200 A.D ). St. Petersburg: Southern Heritage Press, 2000.  
 
Babb, Ellen, “We Took the Leadership Away” In Making Waves, edited by Jack E. Davis 
and Kari Frederickson, 293-309. Gainesville, Florida: University Press of Florida, 
2003. 
 
Bass, Jack, Unlikely Heroes. Tuscaloosa: University of Alabama Press, 1990.  
 
Beifus, Joan Turner, At the River I Stand: Memphis, The 1968 Strike, and Martin Luther 
King. New York: Carlson Publishing Inc., 1985. 
 
Bell, Inge Powell, CORE and the Strategy of Nonviolence. New York: Random House, 
1968. 
 
Carson, Clayborne, In the Struggle: SNCC and the Awakening of the 1960s. Cambridge: 
Harvard University Press, 1981. 
 
Carter, Dan T., The Politics of Rage: George Wallace, the Origins of the New 
Conservatism, and the Transformation of American Politics. Baton Rouge, 
Louisiana State University Press, 1995. 
 
Cobb, James C., Away Down South: A History of Southern Identity. New York: Oxford 
University Press, 2005.  
 93 
 
 
Colburn, David R., From Yellow Dog Democrats to Red State Republicans: Florida and 
its Politics since 1940. Gainesville: University Press of Florida, 2007. 
 
Colburn, David R., and Lance deHaven-Smith, Florida’s Megatrends: Critical Issues in 
Florida. Gainesville: University Press of Florida, 2002. 
 
Daniel, Pete, Lost Revolutions: The South in the 1950s. Chapel Hill: University of North 
Carolina Press, 2000. 
 
Davis, Enoch, On the Bethel Trail. St. Petersburg: Valkyrie Press, 1979. 
 
Davis, Jack E, “Baseball‟s Reluctant Challenge: Desegregating Major League Spring 
Training Sites, 1961-1964.” In The Civil Rights Movement, edited by Jack E. 
Davis, 178-193. Malden, Massachusetts: Blackwell Publishing, 2001. 
 
D‟Orso, Michael, Like Judgment Day: The Ruin and Redemption of a Town Called 
Rosewood. New York: Berkley Publishing Group, 1996. 
 
DuBois, W.E.B., The Souls of Black Folk. New York: Dover Publications, 1994.  
 
Eagles, Charles W., eds. The Civil Rights Movement in America. Jackson: University of 
Mississippi Press, 1986.  
 
Genovese, Eugene D., Roll Jordan Roll: The World the Slaves Made. New York: Vintage 
Books, 1976. 
 
Green, Laurie B., Battling the Plantation Mentality: Memphis and the Black Freedom 
Struggle. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2007.  
 
Honey, Michael, “Martin Luther King Jr., The Crisis of the Black Working Class and the 
Memphis Sanitation Strike,” in Southern Labor in Transition, 1940-1995,  edited 
by Robert H. Zeiger. Knoxville: University of Tennessee Press, 1997.   
 
Jonas, Gilbert, Freedom’s Sword: The NAACP and thhe Struggle Against Racism in 
America 1909-1969. New York: Routledge, 2005.  
 
Massey, Douglas S, and Nancy A. Denton, American Apartheid: Segregation and the 
Making of the Underclass. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1993.  
 
McClellan, James, Liberty, Order, and Justice: An Introduction to the Constitutional 
Principles of American Government. 3
rd
 ed. Indianapolis: Liberty Fund, 2000. 
 
McMillan, Neil R., The Citizens Council. Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1971.  
 
Meier, August and Elliot Rudwick, CORE: A Study in the Civil Rights Movement 1942-
 94 
 
1968. New York: Oxford University Press, 1973. 
 
 
Mormino, Gary, “A History of Florida‟s White Primary.” In Sunbelt Revolution: The 
Historical Progression of the Civil Rights Struggle in the Gulf South, 1866-2000,  
edited by Samuel C. Hyde, 133-150. Gainesville: University Press of Florida, 
2003. 
 
_____. Land of Sunshine, State of Dreams: A Social History of Modern Florida. 
Gainesville: University Press of Florida, 2005. 
 
Patterson, James, Brown v. Board of Education: A Civil Rights Milestone and its 
Troubled Legacy. New York: Oxford University Press, 2001. 
 
Peck, Rosalie and Jon Wilson, St. Petersburg’s Historic 22nd Street South. Charleston: 
The History Press, 2006.  
 
Rabby, Glenda Alice, The Pain and the Promise: The Struggle for Civil Rights in 
Tallahassee, Florida. Athens: University of Georgia Press, 1999. 
 
Rooks, Sandra W., Black America Series: St. Petersburg, Florida. Charleston: Arcadia 
Publishing, 2003.  
 
Saunders, Robert W. Sr., Bridging the Gap: Continuing the Florida NAACP Legacy of 
Harry T. Moore 1952-1966. Tampa: University of Tampa Press, 2000.  
 
Sitkoff, Harvard, King: Pilgrimage to the Mountaintop. New York: Hill and Wang, 2008. 
 
_____, The Struggle For Black Equality. New York: Hill and Wang... 
 
Sullivan, James, “The Florida Teacher Walkout in the Political Transition of 1968,” in 
Southern Labor in Transition, 1940-1995, edited by Robert H. Zeiger. Knoxville: 
University of Tennessee Press, 1997.  
 
Sullivan, Patricia, “Southern Reformers, the New Deal, and the Movement‟s 
Foundation.” in The Civil Rights Movement, edited by Jack E. Davis, 10-29. 
Malden, Massachusetts: Blackwell Publishers Inc., 2001. 
 
 
Walker, Anders, The Ghost of Jim Crow. New York: Oxford University Press, 2009. 
 
West, Cornel, The Cornel West Reader. New York: Civitas Books, 1999.  
 
Woodward, C. Vann, The Strange Career of Jim Crow. New York: Oxford University 
Press, 2002. 
 
 95 
 
_____, Thinking Back: The Perils of Writing History. Baton Rouge: Louisiana State 
University Press, 1986. 
 
Yeshitela, Omali, Social Justice and the Economic Development of the African American 
Community. Oakland: Burning Spear Uhuru Publications, 1997. 
 
 
Dissertations and Thesis: 
 
Christian, Floyd T., “An Analysis of the Philosophy and Policies of the Pinellas County 
Board of Public Instruction.” Master‟s thesis, University of Florida, 1950.  
 
Cutting, Anita Richway, “From Joe Waller to Omali Yeshitela: How a Controversial 
Mural Changed a Man.” Undergraduate Honors Thesis, University of South 
Florida, 2001. 
 
Gooden, Amy, “James B. Sanderlin: The Gentle Giant of Civil Rights in Pinellas County, 
1962-1990.” Undergraduate Honors thesis. University of South Florida, St. 
Petersburg, 1995. 
 
Mantler, Gordon K, “I‟m Against the Way It is Being Done:School Desegregation and 
Civility in Pinellas County, Florida.” Master‟s thesis, University of South Florida, 
2002. 
 
Phillips, Evelyn Newman. “An Ethnohistorical Analysis of the Political Economy of 
Ethnicity Among African Americans in St. Petersburg, Florida.” PhD diss., 
Univerity of South Florida, 1994. 
 
Sakkis, Gus. “A Financial Analysis of Disadvantaged and Nondisadvantaged Black and 
White Elementary Schools in Pinellas County for the Years of 1962-1972.” PhD 
diss., University of South Florida, 1975. 
 
Journal/ Magazine Articles: 
 
Colburn, David R., and Richard K. Scher. “Race Relations and Florida Gubernatorial 
Politics Since the Brown Decision.” Florida Historical Quarterly 55, no. 2 
(1976): 153-169. 
 
Davis, Jack E. “Baseball‟s Reluctant Challenge: Desegregating Major League Spring 
Training Sites, 1961-1964.” Journal of Sports History 19, no. 2 (1992): pg. 
numbers. 
 
Paulson, Darryl. “Stay Out, The Water‟s Fine: Desegregating Municipal Swimming 
Facilities in St. Petersburg, Florida.” Tampa Bay History 4, no. 2 (1982): 6-19. 
 
Paulson, Darryl, and Janet Stiff. “An Empty Victory: The St. Petersburg Sanitation 
 96 
 
Strike,  1968.”  The Florida Historical Quarterly 57, no. 4 (1979): 421-433. 
 
Paulson, Darryl, and Milly St. Julien. “Desegregating Public Schools in Manatee and 
Pinellas Counties, 1954-71.” Tampa Bay History 7, no. 1 (1985): 30-41. 
 
Schnur, Jim. “Desegregation of Public Schools in Pinellas County, Florida.” Tampa Bay 
History 13, no. 1 (1991): 26-43. 
 
Shofner, Jerrell H. “Custom, Law, and History: The Enduring Influence of Florida‟s 
„Black Code.‟” The Florida Historical Quarterly 55, no. 3 (1977): 277-298. 
 
 
Interviews by Author 
 
Charles Rodriguez, July 2009. 
 
Crocket Farnell, February, 2010. 
 
David Seth Walker, March 17, 2010. 
 
Don Jones, August 20, 2008. 
 
Mordecai Walker, August 12, 2008. 
 
Noah Griffin Jr., October 2009. 
 
Omali Yeshitela, June 23, 2009. 
 
Ted Lockhart, November 20, 2009. 
 
Walter Barnes, November 30, 2009. 
 
Archives 
 
Tampa, Florida. University of South Florida Library, Special Collections. 
 Robert and Helen Saunders Papers 
 
St. Petersburg, Florida. University of South Florida 
 Oral History Collection 
 
Washington, D.C. Library of Congress 
 Papers of the NAACP 
 
 
 
 
 97 
 
Reports/Abstracts 
 
Rev. Ben Wyland‟s “Integration: How it Came to St. Petersburg 
 
“To Be Black and Live in St. Petersburg.” St. Petersburg Times Special Report 
 Paulson, Darryl. “The Statistical and Geographical Abstract of the Black 
Population in  the United States: The Black Experience in Selected Major 
Cities—St. Petersburg, Florida. Unpublished. 
 
 
 
Unpublished Essays 
 
Rowland, Monica, “Zone 13: Baker v. City of St. Petersburg: Discrimination on the St. 
Petersburg Police Force.” (unpublished seminar paper, University of South 
Florida-St. Petersburg, 2004). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
